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1 Introduction
In this paper, we provide a positive analysis of the consequences of applying
di¤erent voting systems to select the nominees for general elections. We analyze
and compare the electoral outcomes derived from the closed primaries with the
electoral outcome derived from the top-two primary, with the rst representing
partisan primaries and the second representing non-partisan primaries.
The primary elections describe the process by which the electorate chooses
its nominees (or leaders) for general elections. The origins of the primaries
can be traced back to the Progressive Movement in the U.S., which intended
to introduce more intraparty competition in the selection of candidates.1 On
the one hand, empirical evidence has shown that primaries have fostered com-
petition, especially in those states that lacked of two-party competition (Key,
1958; Grau, 1981; Jewell and Olson, 1978). On the other hand, more than a
century of primaries in U.S. politics has shown some of their faults. In this line,
Ansolabehere et al (2010) and Hirano et al. (2010) highlight the decline of com-
petition in U.S. primary elections. Among other reasons, their evidence shows
that the rise in the value of incumbency has contributed to less competition in
the primary elections.
Despite these long running negative e¤ects, primary elections are of key
interest as there is a growing number of political parties in Western democratic
countries as well as in Latin American countries, with interests in incorporating
such procedures to their governing constitutions. Kenig (2009) shows that the
selection of party leaders has gone through a considerable shift during the last
three decades and some of the political parties in Denmark, France, Finland,
Greece, Italy, Israel, Japan, Norway and the U.K. have incorporated primary
elections to select their leaderships.2 Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006) show
a similar trend for Latin American countries.
Primary elections can be classied as lying somewhere on a scale from open
primaries to closed primaries. In an open primary, registered voters can vote
in any partys primary regardless of their party a¢ liation (these are also called
blanket primaries). In the closed primaries, only those voters that are o¢ cially
registered members of that party are eligible to vote in the primary. In a semi-
closed primary, una¢ liated voters can participate as well.3
Recently, several states in the U.S. have approved and incorporated an al-
ternative open primary to their governing constitutions: the top-two primary
election.4 This is the primary approved by voters in 2004 for Washington State,
in 2010 for California, and in 2011 for Alaska. Depending on the state, the
1The Progressive Movement represented by Robert La Follette, governor of Wisconsin from
1901 until 1906, established direct primary elections in which voters, instead of party o¢ cials,
had the right to select their candidates. Prior to this, candidates had been selected by private
caucuses and conventions rather than by a direct vote by electors (Hofstadter, 1955; Lovejoy,
1941; Merriam, 1909; Merriam and Overacker 1928; Ranney, 1975).
2Hazan (1997) analyzes the case of Israel; Wauters (2010) analyzes the Belgian case.
3Gerber and Morton (1998) describe the di¤erence between closed and open primaries.
Cain and Gerber Ed., (2002), also analyze these primaries.
4These primaries are also known as nonpartisan blanket primaries.
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top-two primary applies to the State Senate, House of Representatives, State
Legislature, and Governor among others. Louisiana has been using a similar
system since 1975 and other states, such as Arizona, New York or Wisconsin,
keep an open debate on the convenience of modifying their primaries by incor-
porating a similar top-two system.5
The top-two primary election eliminates the closed party primaries from the
electoral process and creates a system where all voters (partisan or not) equally
participate at every stage. In the top-two primary, all the candidates, whatever
their a¢ liation (if any), are placed on the same ballot, and only the rst and
second place winners pass to the general election. Candidates have the option
to add their party a¢ liation to their name on the ballot, or they may choose
not to be identied by party. Among other cases, two members of the same
party can move forward to the general election.
The approval of this alternative primary system has been surrounded by
strong controversy. Lawsuits have been led against the law approving the top-
two primary in the states of Washington, California, and Alaska.6 Supporters of
the top-two primary elections have seen in this system the possibility to free their
democracies from partisan gridlock. They argue that the system will give more
choices to the electorate, and that it will result in more moderate politicians
given that moderate candidates have more options to win votes from members
of the other party. The proponent´s argument is as follows: This new system
will elect state o¢ cials who are less extreme on the right or left. In districts with
heavy Democratic voter registration, for example, the two candidates who move
on to contest the general election may both be Democrats. Republicans would
be able to vote for the more moderate Democratic candidate in the run o¤,
rather than having only a choice, for example, between a very liberal Democrat
and a very conservative Republican. Thus, the more moderate Democratic
candidate may win.7 On the other hand, opponents argue that this system
reduces election choices because the top two vote-getters may be of the same
party resulting in only one party being represented on the ballot. All things
considered, the top-two primaries have opened the debate on the roll of political
parties and its inuence in the election of nominees.
The purpose of this paper is to check, in a clear theoretical model, the main
statement defended by top-two supporters. In particular, we want to provide an
answer to the following puzzle: does the top-two primary select more moderate
politicians than the closed primaries? In solving this question we describe a
game-theory setting in which each party runs its separate primary election to
select its nominee. We refer to this setting as the traditional primary system. We
then compare the results of this traditional primary system with those derived
5The di¤erence of the Louisiana primaries with respect to the top-two is that if a candidate
wins a simple majority in the rst round there is no second round. Other states such as Al-
abama, Arkansas, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina and Texas have closed party primaries
in which a runo¤ between the top two is required when the candidates do not reach certain
threshold (Bullock and Johnson, 1992; Engstrom and Engstrom, 2008).
6Concerning the lawsuit seeking to declare the law unconstitutional in Washington State,
the U.S. Supreme Court declared nally that the top-two system is constitutional.
7Proponents of Proposition 14 on California´s June 2010 Ballot.
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from the alternative scenario in which there is a top-two primary system. Two
relevant features of our analysis are the endogenous entry of candidates and the
strategic voting decisions of the electorate.8
When measuring party identication in the U.S., political scientists use the
Likert Scale. According to this scale, Strong Democrats and Strong Republicans
are located at the two extremes of the scale. In between the two extremes are
all the other identications with the following order: Weak Democrat, Lean
Democrat, Independent, Lean Republican, Weak Republican. Thus, we refer
to moderate politicians as those located closer to the middle positions in the
proposed scale.
Outline of the model and the results
We consider four potential candidates whose ideologies are located on the
real line. These candidates are labeled following this order: extreme democrat,
moderate democrat, moderate republican, extreme republican, i.e., each party
has two potential candidates, one extreme and another moderate.9 Voters pref-
erences over the four candidates are single-peaked with respect to the ideological
location of the candidates. We consider six di¤erent proles of preferences, la-
beled as strong, weak, and lean either democrat or republican. For example, a
lean democrat has the moderate democrat as its top option and the moderate
republican, the extreme democrat, the extreme republican as its subsequent op-
tions.10 The single-peak preferences over the ideologies guarantee that there is
a well-dened median voter which we assume, for simplicity, to be unique.
We describe the traditional election system as the one in which each party
holds a separate closed primary. Those voters whose most preferred candidate
is a democrat, vote in the democratic primary whereas those voters whose most
preferred candidate is a republican, vote in the republican primary. Events
unfold as follows: rst, the candidates decide whether to run or not; second,
each party simultaneously runs its primary; third, voters cast their ballot for
one out of the two party-nominees.
We describe the top-two election system as the one in which there is a single
primary. Every voter casts their ballot in the unique primary for one of the self-
declared candidates. The rst and second place winners move to the general
election. Thus, events unfold as follows: rst, the candidates decide whether to
8The endogenous entry is the key assumption in the citizen-candidate approach (see Os-
borne and Slivinsky, 1996; Besley and Coate, 1997). According to these authors, there is a
rst stage in which the citizens choose whether or not to run as candidates, and a second
stage where voters elect one of these candidates. In contrast, we introduce an intermediate
stage with the primary election.
9We analyze the two cases in which the moderate candidate identies with either a weak
partisan or a lean partisan.
10We omit the description of those voters identied as independent. In
fact, according to opinion polls, a substantial fraction of these voters do not
respond and if they do, they split their vote between the two candidates
(http://www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/2ndtable/t9a_1_1.htm). They do not par-
ticipate in the closed primaries (as they lack any party-a¢ liation) and we omit their relevance
in the top-two primaries.
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run or not; second, the single primary takes place; third, voters cast their ballot
for one out of the two nominees.
Both the traditional election system and the top-two system can be described
as a sequential game form with three stages. We solve each of these games
according to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept. Besides, we require
that, at each stage, the players do not play weakly dominated strategies given
the equilibrium continuation strategies. This is a minimal requirement that
renes the equilibrium concept and reduces the number of equilibria (see Bag
et al., 2009).
For each of the two models we describe the set of candidates running in the
primaries and the candidate winning in equilibrium in terms of the possible lo-
cations of the median voter (Theorems 1 and 2). When comparing the results,
we conclude that the top-two election system may contribute to political moder-
ation. In general, any equilibrium winner under the traditional election system
is also an equilibrium winner under the top-two election system. There is only
one exception to this rule: if the overall median voter is weak partisan but the
median voter within his/her party is strong (and some additional mild assump-
tions hold), then the equilibrium winner according to the traditional election
system is an extreme candidate, while the equilibrium winner according to the
top-two election system is a moderate one. On the other hand, not all equi-
librium winners under the top-two election system are also equilibrium winners
under the traditional election system. In particular, if the overall median voter
is strong partisan, then the equilibrium winner under the traditional election
system is an extreme candidate, while under the top-two election system, there
are also equilibria where a moderate candidate wins.
The top-two election system also provides certain chances of winning to
candidates whose ideology di¤ers from that of the median voter. Thus, if the
median voter is lean partisan (and some additional conditions hold), then the
moderate candidate whose ideology di¤ers from that of the median voter can win
in the top two system (but not in the traditional election system). Therefore,
political parties that dominate in safe states could be negatively a¤ected by the
top-two primary system.
We also study the case in which there is a cost of running for election (The-
orems 3 and 4). The results here also support the idea that the top-two election
system contributes to political moderation. In particular, it is still the case that
when the overall median voter is weak partisan and the median voter within
his/her party is strong, then the winner under the traditional system is ex-
tremist, while the winner under the top-two system is moderate. The most
controversial point when there is a cost of running is that, if the overall me-
dian voter is lean partisan and the median voter within his/her party is strong,
the traditional election system has no equilibrium. Nevertheless, we can inter-
pret the absence of equilibrium as indicating that all candidates (in particular,
extremist ones) have a positive probability of winning. Since the equilibrium
winner under the top-two election system in this case is a moderate candidate,




Several authors analyze, from a theoretical perspective, the benets or costs
associated with adopting primary elections. Adams and Merrill (2008) develop a
two-stage election model in which candidates with uncertain campaigning skills
strategically locate their platforms.11 The analyzed closed primaries are proved
to benet both parties, the strong and the weak. The former benets from the
strategic motivation to locate closer to the center of the general election, and
the later benets from the selection of high quality candidates. Serra (2011) and
Hortala-Vallve and Muelle (2012) focus on the party elitesdecision on whether
or not to hold a primary. The former author shows that primaries increase the
valence of the nominee at the expenses of an extra cost of moving policy posi-
tion. The later authors highlight that primaries can act as a mechanism that
prevents political parties from splitting into more homogenous groups. Hirano
et al. (2010) show that the primary election systems do not appear to generate
polarization of the political parties, in contrast to widespread arguments de-
fending the opposite. Snyder and Ting (2011) show from a combined empirical
and theoretical perspective that, on the one hand, primaries raise the expected
quality of a partys candidate and, on the other hand, primaries hurt the ex-ante
preferred party in a competitive electorate by increasing the chances of revealing
the opposing partys candidate as superior.
Closely related to our motivation, we know of two other contributions that
compare di¤erent candidate selection procedures in terms of the induced elec-
toral outcome. Gerber and Morton (1998) show, according to evidence based
on U.S. primary elections, that representatives from closed primaries take pol-
icy positions that are furthest from their districts estimated median voters,
whereas semi-closed primaries select even more moderate representatives than
open primaries. Jackson et al. (2007) develop a two-stage model with a rst
nomination stage and a second general election stage. They analyze three di¤er-
ent scenarios according to the procedure to elect nominees for general elections:
(i) nomination by party leaders, (ii) nomination by the members of the parties,
and (iii) nomination by campaign spending. In their second scenario, nominees
satisfy certain "group stability" criteria by which there cannot be another nom-
inee preferred by a majority of the party given the other party nomination.12
Similarly to Gerber and Morton, they argue that more open selection induces
more centrist candidates.13 In contrast to our analysis, they do not propose
a concrete primary election procedure and their equilibrium concept does not
account for an endogenous entry of candidates.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model
describing a common setting for the analysis of both election systems. Section
11 In contrast to our model, we account for candidates with xed positions with endogenous
entry decision.
12This is a desirable normative property that we think deserves more attention in terms of
the currently used primary procedures.
13 In particular, they show that more extreme outcomes can emerge from spending competi-
tion than from nominations by votes or by party leaders, and that non-median outcomes can
result from any of these processes.
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3 analyzes the equilibria according to the traditional election system. Section
4 analyzes the equilibria according to the top-two election system. Section 5
studies the case in which there is a cost of running. Section 6 compares the
results of the previous sections. Section 7 concludes. All proofs are in the
Appendix.
2 The model
Let C = fD+; D ; R+; R g be a group of candidates running to become a
representative in the legislature. We use the letters D and R to refer to the
democratic and republican candidates. The superscripts + and   mean
extremist and moderate. For example, D+ refers to the extreme democratic
candidate and R  does to the moderate republican one. General elements of C
are denoted by x, y, etc. Each x 2 C is identied with a xed position in the
interval [0; 1] as in Figure 1, so that C is an ordered set with D+ < D  < R  <
R+.
D+ D- R- R+
Figure 1 Position of the candidates once they have decided to run.
Let V = f1; : : : ; vg be the set of voters that must choose one of the candidates
in C. General elements of V are denoted by i, j, etc. Each voter i 2 V has a
(strict) single-peaked preference relation over the set of candidates, i: there
is one candidate, called peak and denoted by p(i), such that, for all x, y 2 C,
if y < x < p(i) or p(i) < x < y, then x i y. We call democratic
partisans the voters whose peaks are a democratic candidate and republican
partisans those voters whose peaks are a republican candidate. We suppose
that democratic partisans always prefer the extreme democratic candidate over
the extreme republican candidate, and republican partisans always prefer the
extreme republican candidate over the extreme democratic candidate.14 Then,
the admissible preferences for each voter i over C are those represented in Table
1 (higher candidates in the table are preferred to lower candidates).
D+ 1D  2D  2R  1R  R+
D+ D  D  R  R  R+
D  D+ R  D  R+ R 
R  R  D+ R+ D  D 
R+ R+ R+ D+ D+ D+
Table 1 Admissible preferences for the voters.
14Thus, the single-peaked preference relations 
D  and R  such that D  D  R  D 
R+ 
D  D






+ are not admissible. This is a simplifying
assumption that can be interpreted as a consistency requirement over the preferences.
7
Let P = fD+ ;1D  ;2D  ;2R  ;1R  ;R+g be the set of admissible prefer-
ence relations and let  = (i)i2V 2 Pv be a preference prole for voters in V.
Let VD and VR be the sets of democratic and republican partisans respectively;
i.e., VD = fi 2 V :i2 fD+ ;1D  ;2D gg and VR = fi 2 V :i2 fR+ ;1R 
;2R gg. Within each group, each type of voter is labeled as strong (when
preferences are D+or R+), weak (when preferences are 1D  or 1R ), and
lean (when preferences are 2D or 2R ).
Let D+ < 1D  < 2D  < 2R  < 1R  < R+ be the order for the elements
of P. Given this order, and for each 2 Pv, let m be the median of the elements
of P at ; i.e., m2 P is such that #fi 2 V : i  mg  v2 and #fi 2 V :i  mg  v2 . Suppose, for the sake of simplicity, that m is unique. We callm the median voters preferences. Notice that, for all x; y 2 C such that
x m y, either (1) x i y for all i 2 V such that i  m, or (2) x i y for all
i 2 V such that i  m. Hence, when comparing any two candidates x and
y, if the median voter prefers x to y, then a majority of voters also prefer x to
y.15
≻D+ ≻1D_ ≻2D_ ≻2R_ ≻1R_ ≻R+
Strong D    Weak D    Lean D    Lean R    Weak R Strong R
Figure 2 Order of the voterspreferences.
For each 2 Pv, let mD be the median of the elements of the set fD+ ;1D 
;2D g; i.e., mD2 fD+ ;1D  ;2D g is such that #fi 2 VD : i  mDg  vD2
and #fi 2 VD : i  mDg  vD2 . We call mD the median democratic
partisans preferences. The median republican partisans preferences,
mR2 f2R  ;1R  ;R+g, are dened in a similar way. Suppose, for simplic-
ity, that mD and mR are unique. Abusing notation, we write mD=D  and
mR=R  to denote mD2 f1D  ;2D g and mR2 f1R  ;2R g, respectively.
Note that there exists a relationship between the median voter and the median
partisans: (i) if m=D+ then mD=D+ (if m=R+ then mR=R+), and
(ii) if m=1D  then mD2 fD+ ;1D g (if m=1R  then mR2 fR+ ;1R g).
Each candidate x 2 C also has a (strict) single-peaked preference relation
over C, x2 P, such that p(x) = x (i.e., the peak of each candidate is his/her
15For this result to be true, it is crucial that the median of the elements of P is dened with
respect to the order D+ < 1D  < 2D  < 2R  < 1R  < R+ . Suppose, for instance,
that we dene the median with respect to the order D+ < 1D  < 2D  < 1R  < 2R 
< R+ . Suppose that m = 1R  and compare candidates R+ and D . Although R+ m
D , we cannot ensure that a majority of voters also prefer R+ to D . To see this note that
neither R+ i D  for all i such that i  1D  (since D  2D  R+), nor R+ i D  for all
i such that i  1D  (since D  2R  R+). A similar problem occurs if m = 2R  . Note
also that, if the preference relations 
D  and R  dened in Footnote 14 were admissible,
there would not be any order for the elements of P for which the median voter predicts the
winner of a majoritarian election.
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self). Thus, the preference relations of candidates D+ and R+ are the prefer-
ences D+ and R+ dened in Table 1, respectively. Similarly, 1D  and 2D 
are admissible preference relations for candidate D , while 1R  and 2R  are
admissible preference relations for candidate R .
In the election systems described below, candidates decide whether to run
or not. We denote ; the situation where no candidate is running and assume
that (i) for each i 2 V, p(i) i ;, and (ii) for each x 2 C, x x ;.
Traditional election system
The traditional election system consists of three stages. In the rst stage, the
four candidates simultaneously decide whether to run or not. In the second
stage, the republican and the democratic parties hold their conventions. In the
republican (democratic) party convention, only republican (democratic) par-
tisans can vote. In the third stage, all voters elect one winner between the
republican and democratic nominees.
Next, we formally dene the sequential game induced by the traditional
election system. At the rst stage, each candidate x 2 C has to choose between
running (Y ) or not (N). Let S1x = fY;Ng denote the strategy space of candidate
x. We call s1x 2 S1x a strategy of candidate x and s1 2 S1 = x2CS1x a strategy
prole played by the four candidates.16
Let 2C be the set of all subsets of C. Let Cr 2 2C be the set of candidates
who are running. Let CrD = fD+; D g\Cr and CrR  fR+; R g\Cr be the sets
of democratic and republican candidates who are running.
Each voter i 2 V has to cast their vote at the second and third stages and,
therefore, their strategy has two components, si = (s2i ; s
3
i ). At the second stage,
i knows Cr. For each democratic partisan voter, i 2 VD, s2i : 2C  ! fD+; D ; ;g
is a mapping such that, for each Cr 2 2C , s2i (Cr) 2 CrD is the candidate for whom
i will vote in the primaries of the democratic party at the second stage if the
candidates who decided to run at the rst stage are Cr. Let S2D denote the set
of all these mappings. For each republican partisan voter i 2 VR, we dene
in a similar way the mapping s2i : 2
C  ! fR+; R ; ;g and the set S2R. Let
S2 = i2VS2i (where S2i = S2D if i 2 VD and S2i = S2R if i 2 VR), and let
s2 = (s2i )i2V 2 S2.
Let xnD 2 CrR and xnR 2 CrR be the democratic and republican nominees,
i.e., the candidates who get the most votes in the democratic and republican
primaries, respectively. Suppose that, if there is a tie in the primaries, any of
the two candidates is equally likely to be the nominee.17 At the third stage, each
voter i 2 V knows both xnD and xnR. Let s3i : fD+; D ; ;g  fR+; R ; ;g  !







R) 2 fxnD; xnRg is the candidate for whom i will vote in the general
16Throughout the paper, only pure strategies are considered.
17For instance, if R+ and R  are involved in a tie in the republican primaries and D 
wins the democratic primaries, then the confrontations R+ versus D  and R  versus D  are
equally likely in the third stage.
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election.18 Let S3i denote the set of all these mappings, S
3 = i2VS3i , and
s3 = (s3i )i2V 2 S3. For each s1 2 S1, s2 2 S2 and s3 2 S3, let x(s1; s2; s3) 2
fD+; D ; R+; R ; ;g be the candidate who wins the general election; i.e., the
candidate who collects the most votes at the third stage. If there is a tie in the
general election any of the two candidates is equally likely win.
Top-two election system
The top-two election system also consists of three stages. In the rst stage, the
four candidates simultaneously decide whether to run or not. The second stage
is the so-called open primary. In this stage all voters cast their votes for one
of the candidates who decided to run. The third stage is the general election
between the two candidates who got the most votes in the second stage.
Analogously to the traditional election system, we model the top-two election
system as a sequential game. The rst stage is identical to that of the traditional
election system. For each x 2 C, T 1x = fY;Ng denotes the strategy space of
candidate x, t1x 2 T 1x is the strategy of candidate x, and t1 2 T 1 = x2CT 1x is a
candidatesstrategy prole.
At the second stage, each voter i 2 V has to vote for one of the candidates
who are running. A strategy at this stage for i is a mapping t2i : 2
C  !
fD+; D ; R+; R ; ;g where, for each Cr 2 2C , t2i (Cr) 2 Cr is the candidate for
whom i will vote in the open primary if the running candidates are Cr. The
strategy space for i at the second stage, T 2i , is the set of all these mappings. Let
t2 2 T 2 = i2VT 2i be a prole of strategies for the voters at the second stage.
Let xn1 ; x
n
2 2 fD+; D ; R+; R ; ;g be the two candidates who get the most
votes at the second stage. We call these candidates the nominees. We assume
that, if there is a tie, any potential pair of candidates is equally likely to move to
the third stage.19 At the third stage, each voter i 2 V knows who the nominees
are. A strategy at the third stage for i is a mapping t3i : fD+; D ; R+; R ; ;g
fD+; D ; R+; R ; ;g  ! fD+; D ; R+; R ; ;g such that, for each pair xn1 ; xn2 2
fD+; D ; R+; R ; ;g, t3i (xn1 ; xn2 ) 2 fxn1 ; xn2g is the candidate for whom i votes
in the general election.20 Let T 3i be the set of all these mappings, T
3 = i2VT 3i ,
and t3 = (t3i )i2V 2 T 3. For each t1 2 T 1, t2 2 T 2, and t3 2 T 3, let x(t1; t2; t3) 2
fD+; D ; R+; R ; ;g be the candidate who gets the most votes at the third
stage. If there is a tie, any of the two candidates is equally likely win.
Equilibrium concept
Since the voting games that we are considering have a dynamic structure, we
will consider subgame perfect Nash equilibria. In addition, as is common in the
literature on voting, we need to eliminate choices that are weakly dominated.




R) = ; if and only if xnD = ; and xnR = ;.
19For instance, if R+ is the candidate who gets more votes and D+ and D  are tied for
second place, then the confrontations R+ versus D+ and R+ versus D  are equally likely in
the third stage. Similarly, if R+, D+, and D  are tied for rst place then the confrontations
R+ versus D+, R+ versus D , and D+ versus D  are equally likely in the third stage.




2 ) = ; if and only if xn1 = xn2 = ;.
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Otherwise there is a large number of trivial equilibria in which each voters
choice is immaterial. For this reason, following Bag et al. (2009), we require
that, at each stage of the game, the strategies of each player are not weakly
dominated given the equilibrium continuation strategies in future stages. Note
that this equilibrium notion is stronger than the undominated subgame perfect
equilibrium (a weakly undominated strategy may be weakly dominated if we
consider that in the continuation game the players play equilibrium strategies).21
Consider the traditional election system. For any s1 2 S1 and x 2 C, let
s1 x  (s1y)y2Cnfxg be the list of strategies of the prole s1 for all candidates
except x. Denote the set of such s1 x by S
1
 x. Similarly, for any s
k 2 Sk
(k 2 f2; 3g) and i 2 V, let sk i be the list (skj )j2Vnfig and let Sk i denote the set of
such sk i. Any equilibrium prole of strategies s
 = (s1; s2; s3) 2 S1S2S3
must have the following properties. In any subgame at the third stage, s3 must
be a weakly undominated Nash equilibrium in the subgame. In any subgame
starting at the second stage, the votersstrategies s2 must be an undominated
Nash equilibrium in the subgame given that the voters play according to s3 in
the continuation game. At the rst stage, the candidatesstrategies s1 must
be an undominated Nash equilibrium given that the voters play according to
s2 and s3 in the continuation game.
Denition: A prole of strategies s = (s1; s2; s3) 2 S1  S2  S3 is an
equilibrium of the traditional election system if:
(a) Subgame perfection: in any subgame, s is a Nash equilibrium.
(b) Non weak domination in the continuation strategy in future stages:








2; s3) x x((s1x ; s1 x); s2; s3) for some s1 x 2 S1 x.
(b.2) for each s1 2 S1 and i 2 V, there is no s2i 2 S2i such that:
x(s1; (s2i ; s
2
 i); s
3) i x(s1; (s2i ; s2 i); s3) for all s2 i 2 S2 i, and
x(s1; (s2i ; s
2
 i); s
3) i x(s1; (s2i ; s2 i); s3) for some s2 i 2 S2 i.
(b.3) for each s1 2 S1, s2 2 S2, and i 2 V, there is no s3i 2 S3i such that:
x(s1; s2; (s3i ; s
3
 i)) i x(s1; s2; (s3i ; s3 i)) for all s3 i 2 S3 i, and
x(s1; s2; (s3i ; s
3
 i)) i x(s1; s2; (s3i ; s3 i)) for some s3 i 2 S3 i.
The denition of an equilibrium of the top-two election system, t = (t1; t2;
t3) 2 T 1  T 2  T 3, is analogous and we omit it in the interest of space.
3 Equilibria of the traditional election system
In this section, we make a detailed analysis of the equilibria of the sequential
game induced by the traditional system. We are particularly interested in gur-
21Not surprisingly, if we simply impose undominated subgame perfection, any candidate
may win the election. That is, for each candidate, there is an undominated subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium such that this candidate results as the winner of the election process.
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ing out who will win the general election in equilibrium. Our analysis, however,
gives us additional information about the proles of equilibrium strategies.
Third stage of the traditional election system
We start analyzing the last stage of the sequential game. At this stage, the demo-
cratic (xnD) and republican (x
n
R) nominees compete in the general election. There
are nine di¤erent types of subgames beginning at the third stage depending on
who the nominees are: (xnD; x
n
R) 2 f(;; ;); (D+; ;); (D ; ;); (;; R+); (;; R );
(D+; R+); (D+; R ); (D ; R+); (D ; R )g. Any prole of equilibrium strate-
gies is such that, in each of these subgames, the median voters favorite candidate
between xnD and x
n
R wins the election. For instance, in any subgame starting at
the third stage where the two nominees are D+ and R , if m = 2D  , then
any prole of equilibrium strategies is such that R  wins the general election,
since the median voter prefers R  to D+, and so do a majority of voters.
Proposition 1 Any prole of equilibrium strategies of the traditional election
system is such that the candidates winning the general election in the subgames
beginning at the third stage are as described in Table 2.
Median voter




; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
D+ ; D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D  ; D  D  D  D  D  D 
; R+ R+ R+ R+ R+ R+ R+
; R  R  R  R  R  R  R 
D+ R+ D+ D+ D+ R+ R+ R+
D+ R  D+ D+ R  R  R  R 
D  R+ D  D  D  D  R+ R+
D  R  D  D  D  R  R  R 
Table 2 Results of Proposition 1: winner in equilibrium in the subgames beginning
at the third stage of the traditional election system.
Second stage of the traditional election system
At the second stage, the parties simultaneously hold their conventions to pick
their candidates for the general election. In the republican (democratic) party
convention, each republican (democratic) partisan has to vote for one of the
republican (democratic) candidates who decided to run.
There are sixteen di¤erent types of subgames beginning at the second stage
depending on who the running candidates are. Our next proposition shows who
wins the general election in equilibrium in each of these subgames depending on
the median voters preferences, the median democratic partisans preferences,
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and the median republican partisans preferences. If there is at most one candi-
date from each party, then there is no decision to be made at the second stage
and the favorite between them for m wins the general election. If only the
two democratic (republican) candidates are running, then the favorite between
them for mD (mR ) wins the democratic (republican) primary and the general
election. If the two democratic (republican) candidates and only one republican
(democratic) candidate are running, then the favorite for mD (mR ) between the
candidates who would win the two potential confrontations in the third stage
wins the general election. If the four candidates are running, then the favorite
candidate for the partisan median voter of the party of the median voter wins
the general election (for example, if m=1D  and mD=D+ , then the favorite
candidate for D+ wins the general election). Furthermore, if m=2D  and
mD=D+ , there are also equilibria in which R  wins (the reason is that voting
for D+ is not weakly dominated at the second stage for voters of type D+
given the continuation equilibrium strategies and, therefore, it can be the case
that D+ and R  are the candidates moving to the third stage in equilibrium).
Similarly, if m=2R  and mR=R+ , there are also equilibria in which D 
wins.
Proposition 2 Any prole of equilibrium strategies of the traditional election
system is such that the candidates winning the general election in the subgames
beginning at the second stage are as described in Table 3.22
Remark 1 In the subgames beginning at the second stage of the traditional
election system where all candidates are running, if m=2D  and mD=D+ ,
there are equilibria in which the candidate winning the general election is R 
and equilibria in which the candidate winning the general election is D . How-
ever, there is no equilibrium where both candidates have a positive probability
of winning the general election. A similar result holds for the case in which
m=2R  and mR=R+ .
22For example, if the median voter is 2
D  any equilibrium is such that, in every subgame
beginning at the second stage where the running candidates are D+ and R , the candidate
winning the general election is R . If the median voter is 1
D  any equilibrium is such that,
in every subgame beginning at the second stage where the running candidates are D+, D ,
and R , the candidate winning the general election is D+ if the median democratic partisan is
D+ , and D  if the median democratic partisan is 1D  or 2D  . If the median voter is 2R 
and the median republican partisan is R+ any equilibrium is such that, in every subgame
beginning at the second stage where all candidates are running, the candidate winning the
general election is either D  or R  (i.e., there exist both, equilibria resulting in D  and
equilibria resulting in R ).
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Median voter
Candidates Median D+ 1D  2D  2R  1R  R+
CrD CrR partisan
; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
D+ ; D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D  ; D  D  D  D  D  D 
; R+ R+ R+ R+ R+ R+ R+
; R  R  R  R  R  R  R 
D+ R+ D+ D+ D+ R+ R+ R+
D+ R  D+ D+ R  R  R  R 
D  R+ D  D  D  D  R+ R+














































































































Table 3 Results of Proposition 2: winner in equilibrium in the subgames beginning
at the second stage of the traditional election system.
First stage of the traditional election system
At the rst stage, the four candidates simultaneously decide whether to run
(Y ) or not (N). From the analysis of the third and second stages, we know
who wins the general election depending on who is running. Theorem 1 uses
this information to calculate which candidates run and which of them win the
general election in equilibrium.
Regardless of who the median voter is, there is always an equilibrium in
which all candidates are running. In this equilibrium, the median voters favorite
candidate wins the general election, except in the case in which m=1D  and
mD=D+ (m=1R  and mR=R+), where D+ (R+) wins. If m=2D  and
mD=D+ (m=2R and mR=R+), there is another equilibrium in which D+
(R+) is not running, although the median voters favorite still wins the general
election. The reason is that, in this case, running is not a weakly dominant
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strategy for D+ (R+) at the rst stage if the equilibrium continuation strategies
are such that R  (D ) wins the general election if all candidates are running.
We make a detailed analysis of these results in Section 6.
Theorem 1 If the voting system is the traditional election system then equi-
librium always exists. The candidates running and the candidate winning the
general election in any equilibrium are as described in Table 4.
Median Candidates running Winner in
voter in equilibrium equilibrium
m=D+ D+; D ; R ; R+ D+
m=1D  D+; D ; R ; R+
If mD = D+ : D+
If mD = D  : D 
m=2D 
D+; D ; R ; R+
D ; R ; R+ (if mD=D+ )
D 
D 
m=1R  D+; D ; R ; R+
If mR = R+ : R+
If mR = R  : R 
m=2R 
D+; D ; R ; R+
D+; D ; R  (if mR=R+ )
R 
R 
m=R+ D+; D ; R ; R+ R+
Table 4 Results of Theorem 1: winner and candidates running in equilibrium in the
traditional election system.
4 Equilibria of the top-two election system
Next, we analyze the equilibria of the top-two election system. For that, we
solve the sequential game induced by this voting system starting from the last
stage.
Third stage of the top-two election system
The two candidates who got the most votes in the open primary at the second
stage, xn1 and x
n
2 , compete in the general election. There are eleven di¤erent
types of subgames beginning at the third stage depending on who the nominees
are (there are two more types of subgames than in the traditional election system
since now the nominees may also be D+ and D  or R+ and R ). As in the
traditional election system, in each of these subgames the median voters favorite
candidate between xn1 and x
n
2 wins the election.
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Proposition 3 Any prole of equilibrium strategies of the top-two election sys-
tem is such that the candidates winning the general election in the subgames
beginning at the third stage are as described in Table 5.
Median voter
Nominees D+ 1D  2D  2R  1R  R+
; ; ; ; ; ; ;
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D  D  D  D  D  D  D 
R+ R+ R+ R+ R+ R+ R+
R  R  R  R  R  R  R 
D+R+ D+ D+ D+ R+ R+ R+
D+R  D+ D+ R  R  R  R 
D R+ D  D  D  D  R+ R+
D R  D  D  D  R  R  R 
D+D  D+ D  D  D  D  D 
R+R  R  R  R  R  R  R+
Table 5 Results of Proposition 3: winner in equilibrium in the subgames beginning
at the third stage of the top-two election system.
Second stage of the top-two election system
At the second stage the open primary is held. All voters cast their votes for
one of the candidates who decided to run. A republican (democratic) partisan
needs not to vote for a republican (democratic) candidate. The two candidates
who get the most votes will advance to the third stage.
There are sixteen di¤erent types of subgames beginning at the second stage
depending on who the running candidates are. In Proposition 4 we analyze who
wins the general election in equilibrium in each of these subgames. If there are
at most two candidates running, then the voters do not have to take any decision
at the second stage and the favorite between them for the median voter wins the
general election. If only three candidates are running, again the favorite between
them for the median voter wins the general election. If the four candidates are
running, then there are multiple equilibria. In particular, if m=D+ , then
there are equilibria where D+ wins and equilibria where D  wins (voting for
D+ and voting for D  in the open primary are the only two strategies that are
not weakly dominated for voters of type D+ given the equilibrium continuation
strategies, and then more than v4 of the voters vote for D
+ and/or D  in the
open primary). If m=1D  , we have to distinguish two cases, depending on
whether more than half of the voters are of type 1D  or not. In the former case,
there are equilibria where D+ wins and equilibria where D  wins (voting for
D+ and voting for D  in the open primary are the only two strategies that are
not weakly dominated for voters of type 1D  given the equilibrium continuation
strategies, and then more than v4 of the voters vote for D
+ and/or D  in the
open primary). In the latter case, in addition to these two types of equilibria,
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there are also equilibria where R  wins the general election (voting for R+ and
voting for R  in the open primary are not weakly dominated for any voter
who is not of type 1D  given the equilibrium continuation strategies, and then
R+ and R  may be the two most voted candidates in the open primary). If
m=2D  , we have to distinguish two cases depending on whether more than
half of the voters are of type 2D  or not. In the former case, there are equilibria
where D  wins and equilibria where R  wins (voting for D  and voting for R 
in the open primary are the only two strategies that are not weakly dominated
for voters of type 2D  given the equilibrium continuation strategies, and then
more than v4 of the voters vote for D
  and/or R  in the open primary). In the
latter case, in addition to these two types of equilibria, there are also equilibria
where D+ wins the general election (there are equilibria where D+ and R+
are the two most voted candidates in the open primary). The cases m=D+ ,
m=1D  , and m=2D  are analogous.
Proposition 4 Any prole of equilibrium strategies of the top-two election sys-
tem is such that the candidates winning the general election in the subgames
beginning at the second stage are as described in Table 6.
Median voter
Candidates D+ 1D  2D  2R  1R  R+
; ; ; ; ; ; ;
D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+ D+
D  D  D  D  D  D  D 
R+ R+ R+ R+ R+ R+ R+
R  R  R  R  R  R  R 
D+R+ D+ D+ D+ R+ R+ R+
D+R  D+ D+ R  R  R  R 
D R+ D  D  D  D  R+ R+
D R  D  D  D  R  R  R 
D+D  D+ D  D  D  D  D 
R+R  R  R  R  R  R  R+
D+D R  D+ D  D  R  R  R 
D+D R+ D+ D  D  D  R+ R+
D+R R+ D+ D+ R  R  R  R+




























(1) Only if #fi 2 V :i=1D g < v=2 (2) Only if #fi 2 V :i=2D g < v=2
(3) Only if #fi 2 V :i=2R g < v=2 (4) Only if #fi 2 V :i=1R g < v=2
Table 6 Results of Proposition 4: winner in equilibrium in the subgames beginning
at the second stage of the top-two election system.
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Remark 2 In the subgames beginning at the second stage of the top-two election
system where all candidates are running, there are di¤erent equilibria in which
the candidate winning the general election is not the same. However, there is no
equilibrium where two or more candidates have a positive probability of winning
the general election. For example, when m=1D  and less than v2 voters are
of type 1D  , there are equilibria where D+ wins the general election, equilibria
where D  wins the general election, and equilibria where R  wins the general
election. Nevertheless, there is no equilibrium where more than one of these
candidates have a positive probability of winning the general election.
First stage of the top-two election system
From our previous analysis we know which candidates win the general election
depending on who is running and who is the median voter. Theorem 2 uses this
information to calculate which candidates will run and which of them may win
the general election in equilibrium.
Regardless of who the median voter is, there is always an equilibrium in
which all candidates are running and the median voters favorite wins the gen-
eral election. If m2 f1D  ;2D g, there are other equilibria in which not all
candidates are running but the median voters favorite still wins the general
election. Additionally, if m=D+ , there are equilibria where all candidates
are running and D  wins the general election (the intuition of this result is
that, in this case, voting for D  in the open primary is not weakly dominated
for voters of type D+ given the equilibrium continuation strategies, and then
there are equilibria where D  passes to the third stage but D+ does not). If
m=1D  , the preferences of candidate D  are of type 1D  , and less than half
of the voters are of type 1D  , there is another type of equilibrium where all
candidates but D  are running and D+ wins the general election (the intuition
of this result is that, if the equilibrium strategies at the second stage are such
that R  wins the general election if all candidates are running, then D  prefers
not to run if the other three candidates are running). Finally, if m=2D  , the
preferences of candidate D  are of type 2D  , and less than half of the voters are
of type 2D  , there is another type of equilibrium where all candidates except
D  are running and R  wins the general election (the intuition of this result
is that, in this case, if the equilibrium strategies at the second stage are such
that D+ wins the general election if all candidates are running, then D  prefers
not to run if the other three candidates are running). The cases m=D+ ,
m=1D  , and m=2D  are analogous.
Theorem 2 If the voting system is the top-two election system then equilibrium
always exists. The candidates running and the candidate winning the general
election in any equilibrium are as described in Tables 7 and 8.
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Median Who would win Candidates running in equilibrium Winner in
voter if all candidates equilibrium
were running










D+; D ; R ; R+8>><>>:








































(1) Only if #fi 2 V :i=1D g < v=2 (2) Only if #fi 2 V :i=2D g < v=2
Table 7 Results of Theorem 2: winner and candidates running in equilibrium in the
top-two election system when the median voter is democratic.
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Median Who would win Candidates running in equilibrium Winner in
voter if all candidates equilibrium
were running










D+; D ; R ; R+8>><>>:








































(1) Only if #fi 2 V :i=1R g < v=2 (2) Only if #fi 2 V :i=2R g < v=2
Table 8 Results of Theorem 2: winner and candidates running in equilibrium in the
top-two election system when the median voter is republican.
5 The case in which there is a cost of running
In this section we study the case in which there is a cost of running for election.
Such a cost is formulated in terms of the following assumption.
Assumption A. Each candidate x 2 C prefers to run if by doing so he/she
alters the result of the election and the winner is more preferred for him/her. If
the election result is the same whether x is running or not, then x prefers not
to run.
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For example, under Assumption A, if (i) the election system is the traditional
one, (ii) m=D+ , and (iii) candidates D+, R , and R+ are running, then
candidate D  prefers not to run, because the winner in equilibrium will be D+,
whether D  runs or not (see Table 3). Similarly, if (i) the election system is
the top-two election system, (ii) m=D+ , (iii) candidates D+, D , and R+
are running, and (iv) the equilibrium strategies in the second and third stages
are such that D  wins the general election if all candidates are running, then
candidate R  prefers to run (even though he/she does not win the election),
because if he/she does not run D+ will win the election in equilibrium, which
for them is less preferred than D  (see Table 6).
The analysis in Sections 3 and 4 for the third and second stage of the tradi-
tional and top-two election systems is still valid in this case. Next, we analyze
the rst stage of the sequential games induced by both election systems when
there is a cost of running.






R+) 2 S1 a strategy prole played
by the four candidates (for example, s1 = (Y;N;N; Y ) denotes the situation
where D+ and R+ are running while D  and R  are not). Abusing notation,
for any x 2 C and s1; s^1 2 S1, we write s1 x s^1 if one of the two following
cases occurs: (i) x prefers any possible equilibrium result in equilibrium after
candidates played s1 in the rst stage to any possible equilibrium result after
they played s^1, or (ii) s1x = N , s^
1
x = Y , and the only possible equilibrium result
after candidates played s1 in the rst stage coincides with the only possible
equilibrium result after they played s^1.
Theorem 3 shows who runs and who wins in equilibrium in the traditional
election system when there is a cost of running. These results are very similar
to those obtained in the case where there was not a cost of running (Theorem
1). There are, however, two main di¤erences. The rst one is that now all
equilibria are such that only one candidate is running. The second di¤erence
is that when m=2D  and mD=D+ there is no equilibrium. Recall that, if
there is no cost of running, there are equilibria in this situation where D  wins
the general election. If there is a cost of running, however, a situation where
only D  is running is not an equilibrium because D+ would prefer to run and
win the general election, and a situation where only D+ and D  are running is
not an equilibrium either, because D  would prefer not to run, since D+ wins
anyway. Given the symmetry of our model, if m=2R and mR=R+ , there is
no equilibrium either.
Theorem 3 Suppose that Assumption A holds and the voting system is the tra-
ditional election system. Then, if (i) m=2D  and mD=D+ , or (ii) m=2R 
and mR=R+ , there is no prole of equilibrium strategies. Otherwise, equilib-
rium exists. The candidates winning the general election in equilibrium are as
described in Table 9 and any equilibrium is such that the winning candidate is






If mD = D+ : D+
If mD = D  : D 
m=2D 
If mD = D+ : @ Equilibrium
If mD = D  : D 
m=1R 
If mR = R+ : @ Equilibrium
If mR = R  : R 
m=2R 
If mR = D+ : R+
If mR = R  : R 
m=R+ R+
Table 9 Results of Theorem 3: winner in equilibrium in the traditional election
system when there is a cost of running.
Theorem 4 shows who wins the general election in equilibrium when the
election system is the top-two election system and there is a cost of running. In
this case, equilibrium always exists. Moreover, any equilibrium is such that the
median votersfavorite candidate is the only one running, therefore winning the
general election. Recall that, besides the equilibria where the median voters
favorite candidate wins, if there is no cost of running and m=D+ , there is an
equilibrium where all candidates are running and D  wins the general election.
This equilibrium disappears if there is a cost of running (the reason is that, if
the strategies are such that when all candidates are running D  passes to the
third stage and wins the general election, then D+ prefers not to run, since D 
will win anyway; but then R+ and R  would prefer not to run either; a situation
where only D  is running is not an equilibrium because D+ would prefer to run
and win the general election). Similarly, the equilibrium where D+ wins the
general election when there is no cost of running, m=1D  , the preferences
of candidate D  are of type 1D  , and less than half of the voters are of type
1D  , disappears when there is a cost of running (if all candidates except D 
were running, then R+ and R  would prefer not to run either, since D+ will win
anyway; a situation where only D+ is running is not an equilibrium because D 
would prefer to run and win the general election). Finally, the equilibrium where
R  wins the general election when there is no cost of running, m=2D  , the
preferences of candidate D  are of type 2D  , and less than half of the voters are
of type 2D  , also disappears when there is a cost of running (if all candidates
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except D  were running, then D+ and R+ would prefer not to run, since R 
would win anyway; a situation where only R  is running is not an equilibrium
because D  would prefer to run and win the general election).
Theorem 4 Suppose that Assumption A holds and the voting system is the
top-two election system. Then, equilibrium always exists. The candidates win-
ning the general election in equilibrium are as described in Table 10 and any









Table 10 Results of Theorem 4: winner in equilibrium in the top-two election
system when there is a cost of running.
6 Comparing the traditional and the top-two
election systems
The case in which there is no cost of running
Theorems 1 and 2 describe all the equilibrium congurations induced by the
traditional and the top-two election systems when there is no cost of running.
First, we make a comparison between the two election systems in terms of the
number of candidates running in the primaries.
The traditional election system is such that there are always equilibria where
the four candidates are running. There is, however, one case in which only
three candidates are running: when the median voter is lean but his/her partys
median voter is strong. This equilibrium is such that all candidates except
the extreme candidate of the median voters party run. If that candidate also
decides to run, he/she would win his/her partys primary, but he/she would be
defeated by the moderate candidate of the opposite party in the general election.
Then, the extreme candidate of the median voters party prefers not to run (see
the proof of Proposition 2, Case 4, and the proof of Theorem 1, Case 3).
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The top-two election system is such that there are always equilibria where the
four candidates are running. Besides, there are equilibria in which only three or
two candidates run. In particular, the equilibria where only two candidates are
running are such that both candidates belong to the same party. For example,
if the median is weak democratic, there is an equilibrium in which only the
two democratic candidates are running and the moderate democratic candidate
wins the general election. This equilibrium is such that, if the two republican
candidates were also running, then the extreme democratic candidate would
win the general election (if all candidates are running, voting for the extreme
democratic candidate is not weakly dominated at the second stage for the strong
and weak democratic voters; see Lemma 2 in the Appendix).
In general, in terms of the number of candidates running for election, the
top-two election system generates more equilibria than the traditional election
system. The new equilibria of the top-two system are such that the number
of candidates who have incentives to enter the race is smaller. Both systems,
however, guarantee that two candidates face each other at the general election.
Figure 3 summarizes these results.
Strong D Strong RWeak D Weak RLean D Lean R Median
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Figure 3 Comparison of the number of candidates who may run in
equilibrium when there is no cost of running.
Next, we compare the two election systems in terms of the candidates who
win in equilibrium.
The traditional election system is such that, in almost all cases, the median
voters favorite candidate wins the general election in equilibrium. There is
only one exception to that rule: the case in which the median voter is weak but
his/her partys median voter is strong. In this case, the candidate winning the
election in equilibrium is not the moderate candidate preferred by the median
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voter, but the extremist candidate of the same party. The reason is that the
nominee of the party of the median voter will eventually win the general election
(no matter who the nominee of the other party is) and, therefore, in the primary
of that party all voters have incentives to vote for their most preferred candidate.
Since the partys median voter is strong, the strong candidate will win that
primary and the general election (see Proposition 2, Case 4, and Theorem 1,
Case 2). However, if the median voter is lean, the extreme candidate of his/her
party cannot win. The reason is that, if the extreme candidate becomes nominee,
he/she will face the moderate candidate of the opposite party in the general
election (and, if the median voter is lean partisan, he/she prefers the moderate
candidate of the opposite party rather than the extreme candidate of his/her
own party).
In the top-two election system, there are always equilibria in which the
median voters favorite candidate wins the general election. Besides, there are
other equilibria where the winner is di¤erent.
Firstly, if the median voter is strong, there are equilibria where the moderate
candidate of the median voters party wins the general election. The reason is
that, in contrast to what occurs in the traditional election system, now voting
for the moderate candidate in the open primary is not weakly dominated for the
median voter given the continuation equilibrium strategies (there are situations
where the median voter prefers to vote for his/her moderate candidate in the
open primary, thus ensuring that candidatess victory, rather than voting for
his/her extreme candidate, because in the latter case a tie occurs in the open
primary and both the moderate candidate of the median voters party and the
moderate candidate of the opposite party, may win the general election with
probability 0:5; see Lemma 1 in the Appendix).
Secondly, as happens in the traditional election system, if the median voter
is weak, there are equilibria where the extreme candidate of the median voters
party wins the general election. For this equilibrium to happen, it is necessary
that (i) the moderate candidate of the median voters party is also weak (i.e.,
if that candidate does not win, he/she prefers the extreme candidate of his/her
party rather than the moderate candidate of the opposite party), and (ii) less
than half of the voters have the median voters preferences. In this case, if
all candidates were running, voting for either candidate of the median voters
opposite party in the open primary is not weakly dominated for a majority
of voters given the continuation equilibrium strategies (in particular, it is not
dominated for the strong partisans of the median voters party; see Lemma 2).
Therefore, the two candidates of the median voters opposite party can pass
to the general election, in which case the moderate one would win. Then, the
moderate candidate of the median voters party prefers not to run, since in this
case the extreme candidate of his/her party wins the general election.23
23This equilibrium is supported by crossover voting since, if the four candidates were in the
race, some voters whose party-a¢ liation coincide with that of the median voter would vote for
candidates of the opposite party. The underlying crossover voting strategies are not weakly
dominated, and the complete lack of coordination devices in the Nash equilibrium concept
generates this type of out of equilibrium strategies.
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Finally, if the median voter is lean, there are equilibria of the top-two system
where the moderate candidate of the median voters opposite party wins the
general election. For this type of equilibrium to happen it is necessary that (i)
the moderate candidate of the median voters party is also lean and (ii) less
than half of the voters have the median voters preferences. In this case, if all
candidates were running, voting for the extreme candidate of either party in
the open primary is not weakly dominated for a majority of voters given the
continuation equilibrium strategies (see Lemma 3). Therefore, the two extreme
candidates can pass to the general election, in which case the extreme candidate
of the median voters party would win. Then, the moderate candidate of the
median voters party prefers not to run, since in this case the moderate candidate
of the opposite party wins the general election.
Note that, in general, if a candidate can win in equilibrium in the traditional
election system, he/she can also win in equilibrium in the top-two election sys-
tem. There is only one exception to this rule: when (i) the median voter is weak
but his/her partys median voter is strong and, either (ii) the moderate candi-
date of the median voters party is not weak, or (iii) more than half of the voters
have the median voters preferences. In this case, the only candidate winning in
equilibrium in the traditional election system is the extremist candidate of the
median voters party, while the only candidate winning in equilibrium in the
top-two system is the moderate candidate of the median voter´s party (i.e., in
this case, the top-two election system elects less extreme candidates).
On the other hand, not all candidates who can win in equilibrium in the
top-two election system can also win in equilibrium in the traditional election
system. In particular, if the median voter is strong, the moderate candidate of
his/her party can win in equilibrium in the top-two election system, but not in
the traditional election system (i.e., in this case, the top-two election system
may elect less extreme candidates). Finally, the top-two election system provides
certain chances of winning to those moderate candidates whose ideologies di¤er
from that of the median voter: if (i) the median voter is lean, (ii) the moderate
candidate of the median voters party is also lean, and (iii) less than half of the
voters have the median voters preferences, then the moderate candidate whose
ideology di¤ers from that of the median voter can win in equilibrium in the top
two system, but not in the traditional election system.
Figure 4 summarizes the results obtained in Theorems 1 and 2 concerning
the candidates who can win the general election in equilibrium as a function of
the median voter.
The case in which there is a cost of running
As Theorems 3 and 4 state, when there is a cost of running, any equilibrium of
the traditional and the top-two election systems is such that only one candidate
is running.
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Figure 4 Comparison of the candidates who may win in equilibrium
when there is no cost of running.
The analysis of which candidates win the general election in equilibrium in
the traditional election system is very similar to the case in which there is no
cost of running. The only di¤erence is that now, if the median voter is lean
but his/her partys median voter is strong, then there is no equilibrium (in all
other cases, equilibrium in the traditional election system exists and the winning
candidates are the same as when there is no cost of running). The reason for
this lack of equilibrium is as follows: (i) when there is a cost of running, there is
no equilibrium where more than one candidate is running; (ii) a situation where
only one of the candidates of the median voters opposite party is running is
not an equilibrium, since the moderate candidate of the median voters party
would prefer to run and win the general election; (iii) a situation where only the
extremist candidate of the median voters party is running is not an equilibrium
either, since the moderate candidate of the opposite party would prefer to run
and win the general election; (iv) a situation where only the moderate candidate
of the median voters party is running is not an equilibrium, since the extremist
candidate of the same party would prefer to run and win the party primary and
the general election.
In the top-two election system, when there is a cost of running, the candidate
winning the general election in equilibrium is always the median voters favorite
candidate (in this case, equilibrium always exists).
Note that, in this setting, the two election systems elect the same candi-
dates in equilibrium except in two cases: (1) when the median voter is weak but
his/her partys median voter is strong, and (2) when the median voter is lean
but his/her partys median voter is strong. In the rst case, the extremist candi-
date of the median voters party wins the general election under the traditional
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election system, while the moderate candidate of the median voters party wins
the general election under the top-two election system (i.e., in this case, the
top-two election system elects less extreme candidates). In the second case, the
traditional election system has no equilibrium, while the moderate candidate
of the median voters party wins the general election in equilibrium under the
top-two election system (if we interpret the lack of equilibrium as the possibility
that extremist candidates may end up winning the general election, then we
could say that the top-two election system also elects less extreme candidates
in this case). Figure 5 summarizes these results.
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Figure 5 Comparison of the candidates who may win in equilibrium
when there is a cost of running.
7 Conclusion and nal remarks
Our analysis disentangles and compares some of the consequences of two dif-
ferent primary election procedures used to select nominees (or leadership) in
representative democracy.
We present a new stylized model in which political partisanship is divided
into two groups, democrats and republicans. In this setting, four potential can-
didates labeled as extreme and moderate partisans, and six di¤erent types of
voters labeled as strong, weak and lean partisans, participate in the electoral
process to select a representative. We compare two election systems: one in
which parties select nominees according to closed primaries (traditional election
system) and another in which nominees are selected according to the top-two
primary (top-two election system). We model these settings as sequential games
and we solve them according to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium concept
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in which every equilibrium strategy is an undominated strategy given the equi-
librium continuation strategies of the game.
As a result of the comparison of the two systems, we conclude that the
top-two election system may contribute to political moderation. In particular,
when the overall median voter is weak but his/her partys median partisan is
strong (and some additional mild assumptions hold), then the only candidate
winning the general election in equilibrium under the traditional election system
is an extremist candidate, while the only candidate winning the general election
under the top-two election system is a moderate one. Furthermore, if the median
voter is strong, then the only winner in equilibrium under the traditional election
system is an extremist candidate but, under the top-two election system, there
are some equilibria where a moderate candidate wins. These results support
the idea proposed by Gerber and Morton (1998) and Jackson et al. (2007)
that the open selection of candidates produces more centrist candidates. In the
particular case of the top-two primary, we show that this system may contribute
to political moderation.
Another observation regarding the top-two election system is noticeable: the
party-a¢ liation of the median voter may not coincide with the party-a¢ liation
of the winning candidate when the median voter is lean and the moderate can-
didate of his/her party is also lean. This possibility is totally discarded in the
traditional election system. Therefore, changing the closed primaries system to
the top-two primary system may increase the number of swing states (the mod-
erate candidate in the opposition under the closed primaries system may have
some chances of winning under the top-two primary system). According to this
last argument, political parties that dominate in safe states could be negatively
a¤ected by the top-two primary system.
Under the assumption that there is a cost of running (so that a candidate
only wants to run for election if, by doing so, he/she ensures that the winning
candidate is better for him/her), some of the equilibrium results change. How-
ever, there are still reasons to support the idea that the top-two election system
contributes to political moderation. In particular, there are situations where
the only candidate winning in equilibrium under the traditional election system
is extremist while the only candidate winning in equilibrium under the top-two
system is moderate (this happens when the median voter is weak but his/her
partys median partisan is strong). Furthermore, if the median voter is lean but
his/her partys median voter is strong, the traditional election system has no
equilibrium when there is a cost of running, while the moderate candidate of
the median voters party wins under the top-two election system. If we inter-
pret the absence of equilibrium as implying that every candidate has a positive
probability of winning, then we could say that the top-two election system also
elects less extreme candidates in this case.
The top-two election system shares some similarities with the runo¤ voting
system used in several countries to elect a president (France, Poland, Argentina,
Brazil, and Colombia, among others). In a runo¤ system, each candidate either
has the support of a political party or is independent, and there cannot be a
party supporting two di¤erent candidates. Moreover, if a candidate receives an
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absolute majority, there is no need for a second round. In contrast, the top-two
election system does not restrict the candidates to be members of di¤erent po-
litical parties, and there is always a second voting round (the general election).
Obviously, these di¤erences between the two systems generate di¤erent strate-
gic considerations. The analysis of the runo¤-system focuses on information
aggregation and its comparison with a simple plurality rule, as well as its prop-
erties in terms of Condorcet e¢ ciency (see Cox, 1997; Martinelli, 2002; Bouton,
2013).24
All in all, our setting provides formal arguments based on rigorous strategic
analysis that can be used in favor of or against the electoral use of the top-two
primary. Our predictions are open to empirical scrutiny but, given that the top-
two primary has recently been incorporated as a candidate selection procedure
in some states of the U.S., there are not yet su¢ cient observations to determine
its impact.
24 In contrast to these authors, we account for endogenous entry of candidates and we have




PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: It follows from the fact that, in any sub-
game beginning at the third stage, voting for his/her most preferred candidate,
xnD or x
n
R, is a weakly dominant strategy for each voter.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: We distinguish four cases.
Case 1. The subgame is such that CrD 6= fD+; D g and CrR 6= fR+; R g.
This case is trivial, since there is no decision to be made at the second stage.
Case 2. The subgame is such that (i) CrD = ; and CrR = fR+; R g, or (ii)
CrD = fD+; D g and CrR = ;.
In any subgame beginning at the second stage with CrD = ; and CrR =
fR+; R g, the candidate who wins the republican primaries eventually wins the
general election at the third stage. Therefore, voting for his/her most preferred
candidate, R+ or R , is a weakly dominant strategy for each republican partisan
i 2 VR. Hence, the candidate winning the election in equilibrium will be R+
if mR = R+ and R  if mR=R  . The case in which CrD = fD+; D g and
CrR = ; is symmetric.
Case 3. The subgame is such that (i) CrD = D+ and CrR = fR+; R g, or (ii)
CrD = D  and CrR = fR+; R g, or (iii) CrD = fD+; D g and CrR = R+, or (iv)
CrD = fD+; D g and CrR = R .
Suppose that CrD = D+ and CrR = fR+; R g. In this case the candidate who
wins the republican primaries will end up running against D+. Let xD+R+ be




+; R+) (from Table 2 we know who this candidate is). Let
candidate xD+R  be dened in an analogous manner. Note that, for each i 2
VR, if xD+R+ i xD+R  (xD+R  i xD+R+ , respectively), then voting for R+
(R , respectively) in the republican primaries is a weakly dominant strategy
at the second stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies at the third
stage. Therefore, the favorite candidate between xD+R+ and xD+R  for the
median republican partisan will win the election in equilibrium.25 The cases (ii)
CrD = D  and CrR = fR+; R g, (iii) CrD = fD+; D g and CrR = R+, and (iv)
CrD = fD+; D g and CrR = R , are analogous.
Case 4. The subgame is such that CrD = fD+; D g and CrR = fR+; R g.
Suppose rst that m2 fD+ ;1D g. From Table 2 we have that the demo-
cratic nominee eventually wins the general election, no matter who the republi-
can nominee is. Therefore, voting for his/her most preferred candidate, D+ or
D , is a weakly dominant strategy for each democratic partisan at the second
stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies at the third stage. Hence,
the favorite candidate between D+ and D  for the median democratic partisan
25For instance, if m=2
R  then xD+R+ = R
+ and xD+R  = R
 . Therefore, (i) if
mR=R  , R  will win the election in equilibrium, and (ii) if mR=R+ , R+ will win the
election in equilibrium.
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will win the election in equilibrium. The case in which m2 fR+ ;1R g is
analogous.
Suppose now that m=2D  . From Table 2 we have that (i) if xnD = D ,





+, then D+ will win the election, and (iii) if xnD = D
+ and xnR = R
 ,
then R  will win the election. On the one hand, since for all i 2 VR, R  i D+,
then voting for R  is a weakly dominant strategy for each republican partisan
at the second stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies at the third
stage. On the other hand, since for all democratic partisan i 2 VD such that
i2 f1D  ;2D g, D  i D+ and D  i R  , then voting for D  is a weakly
dominant strategy for those voters at the second stage given the continuation
equilibrium strategies at the third stage. Then, if mD= D  , D  will win the
election in equilibrium, and if mD=D+ , both D  and R  can be sustained as
an equilibrium.26 The case in which m=2R  is analogous.
PROOF OF REMARK 1: Suppose that m=2D  and mD=D+ . From
the proof of Proposition 2, we know that R  wins the republican primary.
Therefore, the only possibility that R  and D  had a positive probability of
winning the general election would be that D+ and D  were involved in a tie in
the democratic primary (then the confrontations R  versus D+ and R  versus
D  would be equally likely in the third stage and, since m=2D  , R  would
win the general election with probability 0:5 and D  would win the general
election with probability 0:5). In this case, since mD=D+ , at least one voter
whose preferences are of type D+ should be voting for D+ in the democratic
primary. This would not be an equilibrium since this voter would be better o¤
if he/she voted for D  in the democratic primary (in that case, D  would win
the general election with probability equal to one).
PROOF OF THEOREM 1: We distinguish three cases.
Case 1. m2 fD+ ;R+g.
Suppose that m=D+ . From Proposition 2, we know who wins the general
election depending on who is running. Table 11 summarizes this information.
Each of the four tables there corresponds to a di¤erent situation regarding can-
didates R+ and R . For example, the top-left table corresponds to the case
where both R+ and R  are running. Each cell of this table shows who wins
in equilibrium depending on whether, additionally, D+ and D  are running or
26 If mD=D+ , there are Nash equilibria in the game that begins at the second stage where
all democratic partisans with preferences D+ vote for D  and all republican partisans
vote for R  (and then D  will win the election), since a single voter cannot benet from
unilateral deviating. Moreover, in these equilibria, the strategies of all voters are undominated
given the equilibrium continuation strategies in the third stage. Similarly, there are equilibria
where all democratic partisans with preferences D+ vote for D+ and all republican partisans
vote for R  (and then R  will win the election). Note that, once we have eliminated the
strategy of voting for R+ in the republican primaries, then the strategy of voting for D+ is
weakly dominated (given the continuation equilibrium strategies at the third stage) for each
democratic partisan. In this paper, however, we only consider one round of deletion of weakly
dominated strategies.
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not. In particular, if R+ and R  are running and D+ and D  are not, the
winner in equilibrium depends on who the median republican partisan is (R+ if
mR=R+ and R  if mR=R ).
From Table 11 it can be observed that Y is a weakly dominant strategy for
each candidate at the rst stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies.
The case in which m=R+ is analogous.
Case 2. m2 f1D  ;1R g.
Suppose that m=1D  . From Proposition 2, we know who wins the general
election depending on who is running. Table 12 summarizes this information.
It can be observed that Y is a weakly dominant strategy for each candidate at
the rst stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies. Then, any prole
of equilibrium strategies is such that all candidates are running, D+ wins the
general election if mD=D+ and D  wins the general election if mD=D  .
The case in which m=1R  is analogous.
Case 3. m2 f2D  ;2R g.
Suppose that m=2D  . From Proposition 2, we know who wins the general
election depending on who is running. Table 13 shows this information (note
that if all candidates are running and mD=D+ , then both R  and D  can
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N D  R  N D  ;
(1)If mD=D+ (2)If mD=D  (3)If mR=R+ (4)If mR=R 
Table 13 Winner in equilibrium in the traditional election system depending on
who is running when m=2D  .
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It can be observed that Y is a weakly dominant strategy for candidates
D , R , and R+ at the rst stage given any possible continuation equilibrium
strategies. Moreover, if mD=D  then Y is also a weakly dominant strategy
for candidate D+ at the rst stage given any possible continuation equilibrium
strategies. In this case, any prole of equilibrium strategies in the traditional
election system is such that all candidates are running and D  wins the general
election. If mD=D+ , however, Y is not a weakly dominant strategy for D+ at
the rst stage given any possible continuation equilibrium strategies.27 In this
case, there are two possible types of equilibrium strategies: one in which D+
is not running while D , R , and R+ are running and D  wins the general
election, and another one in which all candidates are running and D  wins the
general election.28 Then, if m=2D  , any prole of equilibrium strategies in
the traditional election system is such that D , R , and R+ are running and
D  wins the general election. The case in which m=2R  is analogous.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: It follows from the fact that voting for
his/her most preferred candidate, xn1 or x
n
2 , is a weakly dominant strategy for
each voter in the general election.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: To prove Proposition 4 we need three
previous lemmas.
Lemma 1 If m=D+ , any subgame beginning at the second stage of the top-
two election system where all candidates are running is such that, for any voter
i with i=D+ :
(1) voting for R+ and voting for R  in the open primary are weakly domi-
nated strategies (given the equilibrium continuation strategies) for i, and
(2) voting for D+ and voting for D  in the open primary are not weakly
dominated by any other strategy (given the equilibrium continuation strategies)
for i.
Proof. Let i be such that i=D+ . First, note that voting for D+ in the open
primary weakly dominates to voting for R+ and to voting for R  (given the
equilibrium continuation strategies) for i. We omit the proof of this point in
the interest of brevity. It follows from the fact that, since m=D+ , if D+ is
one of the candidates passing to the next round, then D+ will win the general
election (see Table 5).
Suppose, without loss of generality, that v = 100. Now we prove that voting
for D  in the open primary is not weakly dominated by any other strategy
(given the equilibrium continuation strategies) for i. First, we show that voting
27 In particular, if (i) D , R , and R+ decide to run and (ii) the continuation equilibrium
strategies are such that when all candidates are running R  wins the general election, then
candidate D+ is strictly better o¤ not running than running (since D  D+ R ).
28Note that there is no equilibrium where all candidates are running and R  wins the general
election since, in that case, candidate D+ would prefer to deviate and not run (because in
this case, given any possible continuation equilibrium strategies, D  would win the general
election).
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for D+ in the open primary does not weakly dominates to voting for D  for i.
Consider a prole of strategies in the open primary for the other 99 voters, t2 i,
such that 11 of them are voting for D+, 29 are voting for D , 30 are voting for
R , and 29 are voting for R+. For simplicity, we denote as (D+; D ; R ; R+) =
(11; 29; 30; 29) this situation. If i votes for D , then D  and R  pass to the
third stage and, since m=D+ , D  wins the general election. If i votes forD+,
then D  and R+ are involved in a tie for second place and the confrontations
R  versus D  and R  versus R+ are equally likely in the third stage. Since
m=D+ , D  will win the general election with probability 0:5 and R  will
win the general election with probability 0:5. Since i=D+ , this situation is
worse for i than the one where D  wins the general election with probability 1.
Voting for D  is not weakly dominated for i by voting for R  either. To
see this, consider a prole t2 i such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (9; 20; 20; 50). If i
votes for D  in the open primary then, using a similar argument to the previous
one, we obtain that D  will win the general election. If instead of doing that i
votes for R , then R  will win the general election, what is worse for i.
To see that voting for D  is not weakly dominated for i by voting for R+,
consider a prole t2 i such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (9; 20; 50; 20). If i votes
for D  in the open primary then D  will win the general election. If instead of
doing that i votes for R+, then R  will win the general election, what is worse
for i.
Finally, we prove that voting for D+ in the open primary is not weakly
dominated by any other strategy (given the equilibrium continuation strategies)
for i. That voting for D+ is not weakly dominated by voting for R+ or voting
for R  for i follows immediately from point (1) of this lemma. To see that
voting for D+ is not weakly dominated for i by voting for D , consider a prole
t2 i such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 20; 50; 9). If i votes for D+ in the open
primary then D+ will win the general election. If instead of doing that i votes
for D , then D  will win the general election, what is worse for i.
Lemma 2 If m=1D  , any subgame beginning at the second stage of the top-
two election system where all candidates are running is such that:
(1) voting for R+ and voting for R  in the open primary are weakly dom-
inated strategies (given the equilibrium continuation strategies) for any voter i
such that i=1D  ,
(2) voting for R+ and voting for R_ in the open primary are not weakly
dominated by any other strategy (given the equilibrium continuation strategies)
for any voter i such that i2 fD+ ;2D  ;2R  ;1R  ;R+g, and
(3) voting for D+ and voting for D  in the open primary are not weakly
dominated by any other strategy (given the equilibrium continuation strategies)
for any voter i such that i2 fD+ ;1D g.
Proof. First note that, for any voter i such that i=1D  , voting for D  in
the open primary weakly dominates to voting for R+ and to voting for R 
(given the equilibrium continuation strategies). We omit the proof of this point.
It follows from the fact that, since m=1D  , if D  is one of the candidates
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passing to the next round, then D  (the most preferred candidate for any voter
with preferences type 1D ) will win the general election (see Table 5).
Suppose, without loss of generality that v = 100. Now we prove point (2).
Let i be such that i=D+ . To see that voting for R+ is not weakly dominated
for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (40; 20; 20; 19) then
i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than voting for D+, (ii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (30; 29; 12; 28) then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than
voting for D , and (iii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (50; 20; 10; 19)
then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than voting for R . To see that vot-
ing for R  is not weakly dominated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (70; 10; 9; 10) then i will be better o¤ voting for R  than
voting for D+, (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (30; 29; 28; 12) then i
will be better o¤ voting for R  than voting for D , and (iii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (50; 20; 19; 10) then i will be better o¤ voting for R  than
voting for R+.
Let i be such that i=2D  . To see that voting for R+ is not weakly domi-
nated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 10; 50; 19)
then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than voting for D , (ii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (30; 9; 31; 29) then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than
voting for D+, and (iii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (10; 30; 29; 30)
then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than voting for R . To see that
voting for R  is not weakly dominated for i note that: (i) if t2 i such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (30; 9; 30; 30) then i will be better o¤ voting for R  than
voting for D , (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (30; 8; 31; 30), then i
will be better o¤ voting for R  than voting for D+, and (iii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (10; 30; 30; 29), then i will be better o¤ voting for R  than
voting for R+.
Let i be such that i=2R  . To see that voting for R+ is not weakly domi-
nated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 10; 50; 19)
then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than voting for D , (ii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (30; 9; 31; 29) then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than
voting for D+, and (iii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (10; 20; 50; 19)
then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than voting for R . To see that
voting for R  is not weakly dominated for i note that: (i) if t2 i such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (30; 9; 30; 30) then i will be better o¤ voting for R  than
voting for D , (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (30; 8; 31; 30) then i
will be better o¤ voting for R  than voting for D+, and (iii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (10; 20; 19; 50) then i will be better o¤ voting for R  than
voting for R+.
The proof that voting for R+ and voting for R  are not weakly dominated
for any voter i such that i2 f1R  ;R+g is identical to the proof for the case
that i=2R  .
Finally, we prove point (3). Let i be such that i=1D  . To see that
voting for D+ is not weakly dominated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (30; 8; 31; 30) then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than
voting for D , (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 9; 20; 50) then
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i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than voting for R , and (iii) if t2 i is such
that (D+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 9; 50; 20) then i will be better o¤ voting for D+
than voting for R+. To see that voting for D  is not weakly dominated for
i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 20; 50; 9) then i
will be better o¤ voting for D  than voting for D+, (ii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (9; 20; 20; 50) then i will be better o¤ voting for D  than
voting for R , and (iii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (9; 20; 50; 20)
then i will be better o¤ voting for D  than voting for R+.
Let i be such that i=D+ . To see that voting for D+ is not weakly domi-
nated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 20; 9; 50)
then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than voting for D , (ii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 9; 20; 50) then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than
voting for R , and (iii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 9; 50; 20)
then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than voting for R+. To see that vot-
ing for D  is not weakly dominated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (11; 29; 29; 30) then i will be better o¤ voting for D  than
voting for D+, (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (9; 20; 20; 50) then i
will be better o¤ voting for D  than voting for R , and (iii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (9; 20; 50; 20) then i will be better o¤ voting for D  than
voting for R+.
Lemma 3 If m=2D  , any subgame beginning at the second stage of the top-
two election system where all candidates are running is such that:
(1) voting for D+ and voting for R+ in the open primary are weakly dom-
inated strategies (given the equilibrium continuation strategies) for any voter i
such that i=2D  ,
(2) voting for D+ and voting for R+ in the open primary are not weakly
dominated by any other strategy (given the equilibrium continuation strategies)
for any voter i such that i2 fD+ ;1D  ;2R  ;1R  ;R+g,
(3) voting for D  in the open primary is not weakly dominated by any other
strategy (given the equilibrium continuation strategies) for any voter i such that
i2 fD+ ;1D  ;2D g, and
(4) voting for R  in the open primary is not weakly dominated by any other
strategy (given the equilibrium continuation strategies) for any voter i such that
i2 f2D  ;2R  ;1R  ;R+g.
Proof. First, note that voting for D  in the open primary weakly dominates
to voting for D+ and to voting for R+ (given the equilibrium continuation
strategies) for any voter i such that i=2D  .We omit the proof of this point.
It follows from the fact that, since m=2D  , if D  is one of the candidates
passing to the next round, then D  will win the general election (see Table 5).
Suppose without loss of generality that v = 100. Now we prove point (2).
Let i be such that i=D+ . To see that voting for D+ is not weakly domi-
nated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 20; 9; 50)
then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than voting for D , (ii) if t2 i is such
that (D+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 9; 20; 50) then i will be better o¤ voting for D+
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than voting for R , and (iii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (0; 0; 0; 99)
then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than voting for R+. To see that vot-
ing for R+ is not weakly dominated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (40; 20; 20; 19) then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than
voting for D+, (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (30; 29; 12; 28) then i
will be better o¤ voting for R+ than voting for D , and (iii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (50; 20; 10; 19) then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than
voting for R .
Let i be such that i=1D  . To see that voting for D+ is not weakly domi-
nated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (19; 10; 20; 50)
then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than voting for D , (ii) if t2 i is such
that (D+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 9; 20; 50) then i will be better o¤ voting for D+
than voting for R , and (iii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (0; 0; 0; 99)
then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than voting for R+. To see that vot-
ing for R+ is not weakly dominated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (50; 9; 20; 20) then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than
voting for D+, (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (50; 9; 20; 20) then i
will be better o¤ voting for R+ than voting for D , and (iii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (50; 9; 20; 20) then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than
voting for R .
Let i be such that i=2R  . To see that voting for D+ is not weakly domi-
nated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (8; 20; 50; 21)
then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than voting for D , (ii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (0; 1; 98; 0) then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than
voting for R , and (iii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (50; 10; 20; 19)
then i will be better o¤ voting for D+ than voting for R+. To see that vot-
ing for R+ is not weakly dominated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 21; 8; 50) then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than
voting for D+, (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (50; 20; 21; 8) then i
will be better o¤ voting for R+ than voting for D , and (iii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (8; 21; 50; 20) then i will be better o¤ voting for R+ than
voting for R .
Let i be such that i2 f1R  ;R+g. The proof that voting for D+ and
voting for R+ are not weakly dominated for i is identical to the proof in the
case that i=2R  .
Next, we prove point (3). Let i be such that i=D+ . To see that voting for
D  is not weakly dominated for any i such that i=D+ note that: (i) if t2 i is
such that (D+; D ; R ; R+) = (11; 29; 29; 30) then i will be better o¤ voting for
D  than voting forD+, (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (9; 20; 20; 50)
then i will be better o¤ voting for D  than voting for R , and (iii) if t2 i is
such that (D+; D ; R ; R+) = (9; 20; 50; 20) then i will be better o¤ voting for
D  than voting for R+. To see that voting for D  is not weakly dominated
for i such that i=1D  note that: (i) if t2 i is such that (D+; D ; R ; R+) =
(11; 29; 29; 30) then i will be better o¤ voting for D  than voting for D+, (ii) if
t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (9; 20; 20; 50) then i will be better o¤voting
for D  than voting for R , and (iii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) =
39
(9; 20; 50; 20) then i will be better o¤ voting for D  than voting for R+. To see
that voting for D  is not weakly dominated for i such that i=2D  note that:
(i) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 20; 50; 9) then i will be better o¤
voting for D  than voting for D+, (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) =
(9; 20; 20; 50) then i will be better o¤ voting for D  than voting for R , and
(iii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (9; 20; 50; 20) then i will be better
o¤ voting for D  than voting for R+.
Finally, we prove point (4). Let i be such that i=2D  . To see that
voting for R  is not weakly dominated for i note that: (i) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (20; 9; 20; 50) then i will be better o¤ voting for R  than
voting for D+, (ii) if t2 i is such that (D
+; D ; R ; R+) = (31; 8; 30; 30) then i
will be better o¤ voting for R  than voting for D , and (iii) if t2 i is such that
(D+; D ; R ; R+) = (50; 9; 20; 20) then i will be better o¤ voting for R  than
voting for R+. The proof that voting for R  is not weakly dominated for any
voter i such that i2 f2R  ;1R  ;R+g is identical to the proof for the case
that i=2D  .
Now, we can prove Proposition 4. We distinguish four cases.
Case 1. The subgame is such that, at most, there are two candidates running.
This case is trivial since the voters do not have to take any decision at the
second stage.
Case 2. The subgame is such that only three candidates are running.
Suppose rst that Cr = D+D R . Then, there are three potential pairs of
candidates that may pass to the next round: D+D , D+R , and D R . From
Table 5 it can be observed that, in this case, if m=D+ only two candidates
may win the general election: D+ (if D+ passes to the third stage) and D 
(if D+ does not pass to the third stage). Then, voting for D+ in the open
primary is a weakly dominant strategy at the second stage for any voter who
prefers D+ to D , given the continuation equilibrium strategies at the third
stage. Since m=D+ , a majority of voters prefers D+ to D  and D+ will
win the election in equilibrium. Using a similar argument it can be shown
that, (i) if m=1D  , voting for D  in the open primary is a weakly dominant
strategy for any voter who prefers D  to D+, and D  will win the election in
equilibrium; (ii) if m=2D  , voting for D  in the open primary is a weakly
dominant strategy for any voter who prefers D  to R , and D  will win the
election in equilibrium; (iii) if m=2R  , voting for R  in the open primary is
a weakly dominant strategy for any voter who prefers R  to D , and therefore
R  will win the election in equilibrium; (iv) if m=1R  , voting for R  in the
open primary is a weakly dominant strategy for any voter who prefers R  to
D , and therefore R  will win the election in equilibrium; (v) if m=R+ ,
voting for R  in the open primary is a weakly dominant strategy for any voter
who prefers R  to D , and therefore R  will win the election in equilibrium.
Suppose now that Cr = D+D R+. In this case, only the pairs D+D ,
D+R+, and D R+ may pass to the next round. From Table 5 and using a
similar argument to previous case it can be shown that: (i) if m=D+ , a
majority of voters will vote for D+ in the primary and D+ will win the election
40
in equilibrium; (ii) if m2 f1D  ;2D  ;2R g, a majority of voters will vote for
D  in the open primary and D  will win the election in equilibrium; (iii) if
m2 f1R  ;R+g, a majority of voters will vote for R+ in the open primary
and R+ will win the election in equilibrium.
If Cr = D+R R+, only the pairs D+R , D+R+, and R R+ may pass to
the next round. From Table 5 and using a similar argument to previous cases
it can be shown that: (i) if m2 fD+ ;1D g, a majority of voters will vote
for D+ in the open primary and D+ will win the election in equilibrium; (ii)
if m2 f2D  ;2R  ;1R g, a majority of voters will vote for R  in the open
primary and R  will win the election in equilibrium; (iii) ifm=R+ , a majority
of voters will vote for R+ in the open primary and R+ will win the election in
equilibrium.
Finally, if Cr = D R R+, only the pairs D R , D R+, and R R+ may
pass to the next round. From Table 5 and using a similar argument to previous
cases it can be shown that: (i) if m2 fD+ ;1D  ;2D g, a majority of voters
will vote forD  in the open primary andD  will win the election in equilibrium;
(ii) if m2 f2R  ;1R g, a majority of voters will vote for R  in the open
primary and R  will win the election in equilibrium; (iii) ifm=R+ , a majority
of voters will vote for R+ in the open primary and R+ will win the election in
equilibrium.
Case 3. The subgame is such that the four candidates are running.
Subcase 3.1. m2 fD+ ;R+g.
Suppose rst that m=D+ . Then, more than half of the voters have pref-
erences of type D+ . From Lemma 1, voting for D+ and D  are the only two
strategies that are not weakly dominated in the open primary for these voters
(given the equilibrium continuation strategies). Then more than v4 of the voters
vote for D+ and/or D  in the open primary. Hence, D+ and/or D  go to third
stage and, therefore, D+ or D  may win the general election in equilibrium.29
The case in which m=R+ is symmetric to the case in which m=D+ (there
is also a symmetric version of Lemma 1 for the case in which m=R+).
Subcase 3.2. m2 f1D  ;1R g.
Suppose that m=1D  . From points (1) and (3) of Lemma 2 we have that,
if more than half of the voters were of type 1D  , then more than v4 of the voters
would vote for D+ and/or D  in the open primary. In this case, from Table 5,
D+ and D  would be the only two candidates who might win in equilibrium.
The fact that m=1D  , however, does not imply that more than v2 voters
are of type 1D  . Then, given points (2) and (3) of Lemma 2, we cannot rule
out the possibility that any pair of candidates can pass to the next round in
equilibrium. In particular, it is possible that the candidates who pass to the
next round are R  and R+ in which case the winning candidate would be R .
The only equilibrium result that we can rule out is that R+ wins the general
election (from Table 5, since m=1D  , the only chance for R+ to win would be
29For example, a situation where all voters type D+ vote for D+ is an equilibrium in the
second stage resulting in D+. Similarly, a situation such that (i) all voters type D+vote for
D  and (ii) the candidate who gets most votes from the rest is not D+, is an equilibrium in
the second stage resulting in D .
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that all voters were voting for R+ in the open primary; this situation, however,
would never be an equilibrium since any democratic partisan would prefer to
vote for D+ or D ). Therefore, D+, D , or R  may win the general election in
equilibrium.30 The case in which m=1R  is symmetric to the case in which
m=1D  (there is also a symmetric version of Lemma 2 for the case in which
m=1R ).
Subcase 3.3. m2 f2D  ;2R g.
Suppose that m=2D  . From points (1), (3), and (4) of Lemma 3, if more
than half of the voters were of type 2D  , then more than v4 of the voters would
vote for R  and/or D  in the open primary. In this case, from Table 5, R 
and D  would be the only two candidates who might win in equilibrium. The
fact that m=2D  , however, does not imply that more than v2 voters are of
type 2D  . Given point (2) of Lemma 3, it is possible that the candidates who
pass to the next round are D+ and R+ in which case the winning candidate
would be D+. As in the case that m=1D  , the only equilibrium result that
we can rule out is that R+ wins the general election. Therefore, D , R , or
D+ may win the general election in equilibrium.31 The case in which m=2R 
is symmetric to the case in which m=2D  (there is also a symmetric version
of Lemma 3 for the case in which m=2R ).
PROOF OF REMARK 2: Suppose rst that m=D+ . As we have shown
in Proposition 4, in the subgames beginning at the second stage of the top-
two election system where all candidates are running, there are equilibria in
which D+ wins the general election and equilibria in which D  wins the general
election. However, there is no equilibrium in which there is a tie in the open
primary and both, D+ and D , have a positive probability of winning the
general election. The only possibility for that to happen would be that, in the
open primary, D  was the most voted candidate and D+ was one of the second
most voted candidates tied with at least another candidate.32 In that case, since
30For example, a situation where all voters type D+ and 1D  vote for D  while the rest
vote for R  would be an equilibrium in the second stage resulting in D  (since m=1
D  ,
more than a half of the voters are of type D+ or 1D  ). Similarly, a situation where all
voters type D+ and 1D  vote for D+, while the rest vote for R  would be an equilibrium
in the second stage resulting in D+. Finally, if less than a half of the voters are of type 1
D  ,
a situation where half of the voters type 1
D  vote for D
 , the other half of the voters type
1
D  vote for D
+, half of the rest of voters vote for R , while the other half vote for R+,
would be an equilibrium in the second stage resulting in R .
31For example, a situation where all voters type D+ , 1D  , and 2D  vote for D  while
the rest vote for D+ would be an equilibrium in the second stage resulting in D  (since
m=2
D  , more than a half of the voters are of type D+ , 1D  , or 2D  ). Similarly, a
situation where all voters type 2
D  , 2R  , 1R  , and R+ vote for R , while the rest vote
for D+ would be an equilibrium in the second stage resulting in R  (since m=2
D  , more
than a half of the voters are of type 2
D  , 2R  , 1R  , or R+ ) Finally, if less than a half of
the voters are of type 2
D  , a situation where half of the voters type 2D  vote for R , the
other half of the voters type 2
D  vote for D
 , half of the rest of voters vote for R+, while
the other half vote for D+, would be an equilibrium in the second stage resulting in D+.
32Note that in this case a triple or a quadruple tie in the rst position is not possible.
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m=D+ , at least one voter with preferences type D+ should be voting for a
candidate di¤erent from D+ in the open primary. Note that this would not be
an equilibrium since this voter would be better o¤ if he/she voted for D+ in the
open primary (in that case, D+ would win the general election with probability
equal to one).
Suppose now that m=1D  . As we have shown in Proposition 4, in the
subgames beginning at the second stage of the top-two election system where
all candidates are running, there are equilibria in which D  wins the general
election, equilibria in which D+ wins the general election, and equilibria in
which R  wins the general election. Nevertheless, there is no equilibrium in
which there is a tie in the open primary and more than one candidate have a
positive probability of winning the general election. To see this note that:
(1) There is no equilibrium in which there is a tie in the open primary and
both, D+ and D , have positive probability of winning the general election
(but not R ). The only possibility for that to happen would be that, in the
open primary, D  was involved in a tie in the rst or second positions. Since
m=1D  , at least one voter whose preferences are not of type D+ should
be voting for a candidate di¤erent from D  in the open primary. This would
not be an equilibrium since this voter would be better o¤ if he/she voted for
D  in the open primary (in that case, D  would win the general election with
probability equal to one).
(2) There is no equilibrium in which there is a tie in the open primary and
both, D  and R , have positive probability of winning the general election
(but not D+). The only possibility for that to happen would be that, in the
open primary, D  was involved in a tie in the rst or second positions. Since
m=1D  , at least one voter whose preferences are of type D+ or 1D  should
be voting for a candidate di¤erent from D  in the open primary. Note that
this voter prefers D  to R . Then, this would not be an equilibrium since this
voter would be better o¤ if he/she voted for D  in the open primary (in that
case, D  would win the general election with probability equal to one).
(3) There is no equilibrium in which there is a tie in the open primary and
both, D+ and R , have positive probability of winning the general election (but
not D ). The only possibility for that to happen would be that, in the open
primary, D+ was involved in a tie in the rst or second positions and D  was
in the last position. Since m=1D  , at least one voter whose preferences are
of type D+ or 1D  should be voting for a candidate di¤erent from D+ in the
open primary. Note that this voter prefers D+ to R . Then, this would not be
an equilibrium since this voter would be better o¤ if he/she voted for D+ in the
open primary (in that case, D+ would win the general election with probability
equal to one).
(4) There is no equilibrium in which there is a tie in the open primary and
D , D+, and R  have positive probability of winning the general election.
There would be three possibilities for that to happen: (4.1) R+ was in the rst
position and D+, D , and R  were involved in a tie in the second position,
(4.2) R  was in the rst position and D+, D , and R+ were involved in a tie
in the second position, and (4.3) D+, D , R , and R+ were involved in a tie in
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the rst position. Suppose that case (4.1) occurs. For that situation being an
equilibrium, all voters type D+ should be voting for D+ (otherwise they could
improve by deviating unilaterally and voting for D+) and all voters type 1D 
and 2D  should be voting for D  (otherwise they could improve by deviating
unilaterally and voting for D ). Since m=1D  , #fi 2 V :i2 fD+ ;1D 
;2D gg > v2 . Therefore, the number of voters who were voting for D+ and/or
D should be greater than v4 . Hence, since D
+, D , and R  were involved in a
tie, the number of voters who were voting for each of these candidates should be
greater than v4 , which contradicts that R
+ was in the rst position. The proofs
that cases (4.2) and (4.3) cannot occur are analogous.
Suppose now that m=2D  . As we have shown in Proposition 4, in the
subgames beginning at the second stage of the top-two election system where
all candidates are running, there are equilibria in which D  wins the general
election, equilibria in which R  wins the general election, and equilibria in
which D+ wins the general election. However, there is no equilibrium in which
there is a tie in the open primary and more than one candidate have a positive
probability of winning the general election. To see this note that:
(1) There is no equilibrium in which there is a tie in the open primary and
both, D  and R , have positive probability of winning the general election
(but not R ). The only possibility for that to happen would be that, in the
open primary, D  was involved in a tie in the rst or second positions. Since
m=2D  , at least one voter whose preferences are of type D+ , 1D  , or 2D 
should be voting for a candidate di¤erent from D  in the open primary. This
would not be an equilibrium since this voter would be better o¤ if he/she voted
for D  in the open primary (in that case, D  would win the general election
with probability equal to one).
(2) There is no equilibrium in which there is a tie in the open primary and
both, D  and D+, have positive probability of winning the general election
(but not R ). The only possibility for that to happen would be that, in the
open primary, D  was involved in a tie in the rst or second positions. Since
m=2D  , at least one voter whose preferences are not of type D+ should be
voting for a candidate di¤erent from D  in the open primary. Note that this
voter prefers D  to D+. Then, this would not be an equilibrium since this voter
would be better o¤ if he/she voted for D  in the open primary (in that case,
D  would win the general election with probability equal to one).
(3) There is no equilibrium in which there is a tie in the open primary and
both, R  and D+, have positive probability of winning the general election (but
not D ). The only possibility for that to happen would be that, in the open
primary, R  was involved in a tie in the rst or second positions and D  was in
the last position. Since m=2D  , at least one voter whose preferences are of
type 2D  , 2R  , 1R  , or D+ should be voting for a candidate di¤erent from
R  in the open primary. Note that this voter prefers R  to D+. Then, this
would not be an equilibrium since this voter would be better o¤ if he/she voted
for R  in the open primary (in that case, R  would win the general election
with probability equal to one).
(4) There is no equilibrium in which there is a tie in the open primary and
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D , R , and D+ have positive probability of winning the general election.
There would be three possibilities for that to happen: (4.1) R+ was in the rst
position and D+, D , and R  were involved in a tie in the second position,
(4.2) D+ was in the rst position and D , R , and R+ were involved in a
tie in the second position, and (4.3) D+, D , R , and R+ were involved in
a tie in the rst position. Suppose that case (4.1) occurs. For that situation
being an equilibrium, all voters type 1D  and 2D  should be voting for D 
(otherwise they could improve by deviating unilaterally and voting for D ) and
all voters type 2R  , 1R  , and R+ should be voting for R  (otherwise they
could improve by deviating unilaterally and voting for R ). Since m=2D  ,
#fi 2 V :i2 f1D  ;2D  ;2R  ;1R  ;R+gg > v2 . Therefore, the number of
voters who were voting for D  and/or R should be greater than v4 . Hence,
since D+, D , and R  were involved in a tie, the number of voters who were
voting for each of these candidates should be greater than v4 , which contradicts
that R+ was in the rst position. The proofs that cases (4.2) and (4.3) cannot
occur are analogous.
The cases where m=R+ , m=1R  , and m=2R  are mirror images
of cases where m=D+ , m=1D  , and m=2D  , and the corresponding
arguments apply.
PROOF OF THEOREM 2: We distinguish three cases.
Case 1. m2 fD+ ;R+g.
Suppose rst that m=D+ . From Proposition 4, we know who wins the
general election depending on who is running in this case. Table 14 summarizes
this information. Note that Y is a weakly dominant strategy for each candidate
at the rst stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies. In this case, any
prole of equilibrium strategies in the top-two election system is such that all
candidates are running and D+ or D  win the general election. The case in




Y N Y N
Y D+ Y D+ or D  D+ D+ Y D+ D+
N D  R  N D  R+
R+
D  D 
Y N Y N
N D+ Y D+ D+ D+ Y D+ D+
N D  R  N D  ;
Table 14 Winner in equilibrium in the top-two election system depending on who
is running when m=D+ .
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Case 2. m2 f1D  ;1R g.
Suppose rst that m=1D  . From Proposition 4, we know who wins the





Y N Y NY
D+ Y D+ or D  or R () D+ D+ Y D  D+
N D  R  N D  R+
R+
D  D 
Y N Y N
N D+ Y D  D+ D+ Y D  D+
N D  R  N D  ;
() Only if #fi 2 V :i=1D g < v=2
Table 15 Winner in equilibrium in the top-two election system depending on who
is running when m=1D  .
We distinguish three subcases:
Subcase 2.1. The equilibrium strategies in the second and third stages are
such that, if all candidates are running, D+ wins the general election (i.e., D+
is in the upper left cell in Table 15).
In this case, Y is a weakly dominant strategy for candidates D+ and D 
at the rst stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies. Given this, in
Table 15 can be seen that there are three types of equilibria: one in which
all candidates except R+ are running, one in which all candidates except R 
are running, and one in which D+ and D  are running and R+ and R  are
not running (all candidates running is not an equilibrium because in that case
both, R+ and R , have incentives to unilaterally deviate). The three types of
equilibrium yields the same result: D  wins the general election.
Subcase 2.2. The equilibrium strategies in the second and third stages are
such that, if all candidates are running, D  wins the general election (i.e., D 
is in the upper left cell in Table 15).
In this case, Y is a weakly dominant strategy for all candidates at the rst
stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies, and then D  wins the gen-
eral election.
Subcase 2.3. The equilibrium strategies in the second and third stages are
such that, if all candidates are running, R  wins the general election (i.e., R 
is in the upper left cell in Table 15).
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In this case, Y is a weakly dominant strategy for candidates R+ and R 
at the rst stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies. Moreover, Y
is a weakly dominant strategy for candidate D  if his/her preferences are of
type 2D  , but not if his/her preferences are of type 1D  (in the latter case,
if the other three candidates are running, D  prefers not to run, since he/she
prefers D+ to R ). Then, if the preferences of candidate D  are of type 2D  ,
candidates R+, R , and D  will run and, given this, D+ prefers not to run.
This equilibrium results in D  winning the general election. If the preferences
of candidate D  are of type 1D  , then there are two types of equilibria: one
in which all candidates except D+ are running (which result in D  winning the
general election), and one in which all candidates except D  are running (which
result in D+ winning the general election).
The case in which m=1R  is analogous.
Case 3. m2 f2D  ;2R g.
From Proposition 4, we know who wins the general election depending on




Y N Y NY
D+ Y D+() or D  or R  R  D+ Y D  D+
N D  R  N D  R+
R+
D  D 
Y N Y N
N D+ Y D  R  D+ Y D  D+
N D  R  N D  ;
() Only if #fi 2 V :i=2D g < v=2
Table 16 Winner in equilibrium in the top-two election system depending on who
is running when m=2D  .
We distinguish three subcases:
Subcase 3.1. The equilibrium strategies in the second and third stages are
such that, if all candidates are running, D+ wins the general election (i.e., D+
is in the upper left cell in Table 16).
In this case, Y is a weakly dominant strategy for candidate D+ at the rst
stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies. If the preferences of candi-
dateD  are of type 1D  , then Y is also a weakly dominant strategy for him/her
given the continuation equilibrium strategies, and there are three types of equi-
libria: one in which all candidates except R+ are running, one in which all
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candidates except R  are running, and one in which D+ and D  are running
and R+ and R  are not running (all candidates running is not an equilibrium
because in that case both, R+ and R , have incentives to unilaterally deviate).
The three types of equilibrium yields the same result: D  wins the general elec-
tion. If the preferences of candidate D  are of type 2D  , then Y is not a weakly
dominant strategy for him/her given the continuation equilibrium strategies (if
the other three candidates are running, D  prefers not to run, since he/she
prefers R  to D+). In this case, there are four types of equilibria: one in which
all candidates except D  are running, one in which all candidates except R+
are running, one in which all candidates except R  are running, and one in
which D+ and D  are running and R+ and R  are not running. In the rst
type of equilibrium R  wins the general election, while in the other three types
of equilibria D  wins the general election.
Subcase 3.2. The equilibrium strategies in the second and third stages are
such that, if all candidates are running, D  wins the general election (i.e., D 
is in the upper left cell in Table 16).
In this case, Y is a weakly dominant strategy for all candidates at the rst
stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies, and then D  wins the gen-
eral election.
Subcase 3.3. The equilibrium strategies in the second and third stages are
such that, if all candidates are running, R  wins the general election (i.e., R 
is in the upper left cell in Table 16).
In this case, Y is a weakly dominant strategy for candidates D , R , and
R+ at the rst stage given the continuation equilibrium strategies. Then, can-
didates D , R , and R+ will run and, given this, D+ prefers not to run. This
equilibrium results in D  winning the general election.
The case in which m=2R  is analogous.
PROOF OF THEOREM 3: We distinguish three cases:
Case 1. m2 fD+ ;R+g.
Suppose that m=D+ . Table 11 shows who wins the general election de-
pending on who is running in this case. Observe that Y is a weakly dominant
strategy for D+ given the continuation equilibrium strategies. Unlike what hap-
pens when there is no cost of running, however, now Y is not a weakly dominant
strategy for D , R , and R+ given the continuation equilibrium strategies (for
example, if the other three candidates are running, D  prefers not to run,
since the fact that he/she runs does not change the result of the general elec-
tion). Note that (Y;N; Y; Y ) D  (Y; Y; Y; Y ), (Y;N;N; Y ) R  (Y;N; Y; Y ),
(Y; Y;N;N) R+ (Y; Y;N; Y ), (Y;N;N;N) R+ (Y;N;N; Y ), (Y;N; Y;N) D 
(Y; Y; Y;N), (Y;N;N;N) R  (Y;N; Y;N), (Y;N;N;N) D  (Y; Y;N;N), and
(Y;N;N;N) D+ (N;N;N;N). Therefore, any prole of equilibrium strategies
is such that s1 = (Y;N;N;N) and D+ wins the general election. The case in
which m=R+ is analogous.
Case 2. m2 f1D  ;1R g.
Suppose that m=1D  . In this case, Table 12 shows who wins the general
election depending on who is running when the election system is the tradi-
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tional election system. Note that (Y; Y; Y;N) R+ (Y; Y; Y; Y ), (Y;N;N; Y )
R  (Y;N; Y; Y ), (N;Y; Y;N) R+ (N;Y; Y; Y ), (N;Y; Y; Y ) D  (N;N; Y; Y ),
(Y; Y;N;N) R  (Y; Y; Y;N), (Y;N;N;N) R  (Y;N; Y;N), (N;Y;N;N) R 
(N;Y; Y;N), (N;Y; Y;N)D  (N;N; Y;N), (Y; Y;N;N)R+ (Y; Y;N; Y ), (Y;N;
N;N) R+ (Y;N; N; Y ), (N;Y;N;N) R+ (N;Y;N; Y ), (N;Y;N; Y ) D 
(N;N;N; Y ), (Y;N;N;N)D+ (N;N;N;N), and (N;Y;N;N)D  (N;N;N;N).
Moreover, if mD=D+ , then (Y;N;N;N) D  (Y; Y;N;N) and (Y; Y;N;N)
D+ (N;Y;N;N). Similarly, if mD2 f1D  ;2D g, then (N;Y;N;N) D+
(Y; Y;N;N) and (Y; Y;N;N) D  (Y;N;N;N). Therefore: (i) if mD=D+ ,
any prole of equilibrium strategies is such that s1 = (Y;N;N;N) and D+ wins
the general election, and (ii) if mD2 f1D  ;2D g, any prole of equilibrium
strategies is such that s1 = (N;Y;N;N) and D  wins the general election.33
The case in which m=1R  is analogous.
Case 3. m2 f2D  ;2R g.
Suppose that m=2D  . In this case, Table 13 shows who wins the general
election depending on who is running when the election system is the tradi-
tional election system. Note that (N;Y; Y; Y ) D+ (Y; Y; Y; Y ), (Y;N; Y;N)
R+ (Y;N; Y; Y ), (N;Y; Y;N) R+ (N;Y; Y; Y ), (N;Y; Y; Y ) D  (N;N; Y; Y ),
(N;Y; Y;N) D+ (Y; Y; Y;N), (N;N; Y;N) D+ (Y;N; Y;N), (N;Y;N;N) R 
(N;Y; Y;N), (N;Y; Y;N)D  (N;N; Y;N), (Y; Y;N;N)R+ (Y; Y;N; Y ), (Y;N;
N;N) R+ (Y;N; N; Y ), (N;Y;N;N) R+ (N;Y;N; Y ), (N;Y;N; Y ) D 
(N;N;N; Y ), (Y;N; Y;N)R  (Y;N;N;N), and (N;Y;N;N)D  (N;N;N;N).
Moreover, if mD=D+ , then (Y;N;N;N) D  (Y; Y;N;N) and (Y; Y;N;N)
D+ (N;Y;N;N), and hence there is no prole of equilibrium strategies. If
mD2 f1D  ;2D g, however, then (N;Y;N;N) D+ (Y; Y;N;N), and therefore
any prole of equilibrium strategies is such that s1 = (N;Y;N;N) and D  wins
the general election. The case in which m=2R  is analogous.34
PROOF OF THEOREM 4: We distinguish three cases:
Case 1. m2 fD+ ;R+g.
Suppose that m=D+ . In this case, Table 14 shows who wins the general
election depending on who is running when the election system is the top-two
system. Note that (Y;N;N; Y ) R  (Y;N; Y; Y ), (N;Y; Y;N) R+ (N;Y; Y; Y ),
(N;Y; Y; Y ) D  (N;N; Y; Y ), (Y; Y;N;N) R  (Y; Y; Y;N), (Y;N; N;N) R 
(Y;N; Y;N), (N;Y;N;N) R  (N;Y; Y;N), (N;Y; Y;N) D  (N;N; Y;N),
(Y; Y;N;N)R+ (Y; Y;N; Y ), (Y;N; N;N)R+ (Y;N; N; Y ), (N;Y;N;N)R+
(N;Y;N; Y ), (N;Y;N; Y ) D  (N;N;N; Y ), (Y;N;N;N) D  (Y; Y;N;N),
(Y; Y;N;N) D+ (N;Y; N;N), and (Y;N;N;N) D+ (N;N; N;N). More-
over, if the equilibrium strategies in the second and third stages are such that
33Note that, in this case, Y is not a weakly dominant strategy for R  and R+ given the
continuation equilibrium strategies. Moreover, if mD=D+ , then Y is not a weakly dominant
strategy for D , and if mD2 f1D  ;2D g, then Y is not a weakly dominant strategy for
D+ (given the continuation equilibrium strategies).
34Note that, in this case, (i) Y is not a weakly dominant strategy for R  and R+, (ii) if
mD=D+ , then Y is not a weakly dominant strategy for D , and (iii) if mD2 f1D  ;2D 
g, then Y is not a weakly dominant strategy for D+ (given the continuation equilibrium
strategies).
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D+ (respectively D ) wins the general election if all candidates are running,
then (Y;N; Y; Y ) D  (Y; Y; Y; Y ) (respectively (N;Y; Y; Y ) D+ (Y; Y; Y; Y )).
Therefore, any prole of equilibrium strategies is such that s1 = (Y;N;N;N)
and D+ wins the general election.35 The case in which m=R+ is analogous.
Case 2. m2 f1D  ;1R g.
Suppose that m=1D  . In this case, Table 15 shows who wins the general
election depending on who is running when the election system is the top-two
system. Note that (Y;N;N; Y ) R  (Y;N; Y; Y ), (N;Y; Y;N) R+ (N;Y; Y; Y ),
(N;Y; Y; Y ) D  (N;N; Y; Y ), (Y; Y;N;N) R  (Y; Y; Y;N), (Y;N; N;N) R 
(Y;N; Y;N), (N;Y;N;N) R  (N;Y; Y;N), (N;Y; Y;N) D  (N;N; Y;N),
(Y; Y;N;N)R+ (Y; Y;N; Y ), (Y;N; N;N)R+ (Y;N; N; Y ), (N;Y;N;N)R+
(N;Y;N; Y ), (N;Y;N; Y ) D  (N;N;N; Y ), (N;Y;N;N) D+ (Y; Y;N;N),
(Y; Y;N;N) D  (Y;N; N;N), and (N;Y;N;N) D  (N;N; N;N). Moreover,
if the equilibrium strategies in the second and third stages are such that D+
(respectively D  or R ) wins the general election if all candidates are running,
then (Y;N; Y; Y ) D  (Y; Y; Y; Y ) (respectively (N;Y; Y; Y ) D+ (Y; Y; Y; Y )).
Therefore, any prole of equilibrium strategies is such that s1 = (N;Y;N;N)
and D  wins the general election.36 The case in which m=1R  is analogous.
Case 3. m2 f2D  ;2R g.
Suppose that m=2D  . Table 16 shows who wins the general election
depending on who is running when the election system is the top-two sys-
tem. Note that (N;N; Y; Y ) D+ (Y;N; Y; Y ), (N;Y; Y;N) R+ (N;Y; Y; Y ),
(N;Y; Y; Y ) D  (N;N; Y; Y ), (Y; Y;N;N) R  (Y; Y; Y;N), (N;N; Y;N) D+
(Y;N; Y;N), (N;Y;N;N) R  (N;Y; Y;N), (N;Y; Y;N) D  (N;N; Y;N),
(Y; Y;N;N)R+ (Y; Y;N; Y ), (Y;N; N;N)R+ (Y;N; N; Y ), (N;Y;N;N)R+
(N;Y;N; Y ), (N;Y;N; Y ) D  (N;N;N; Y ), (N;Y;N;N) D+ (Y; Y;N;N),
(Y; Y;N;N) D  (Y;N;N;N), and (N;Y;N;N) D  (N;N; N;N). Moreover,
if the equilibrium strategies in the second and third stages are such that D+
or D  (respectively R ) wins the general election if all candidates are running,
then (Y; Y;N; Y ) R  (Y; Y; Y; Y ) (respectively (Y;N; Y; Y ) D  (Y; Y; Y; Y )).
Therefore, any prole of equilibrium strategies is such that s1 = (N;Y;N;N)
and D  wins the general election.37 The case where m=2R  is analogous.
35Observe that, in this case, Y is not a weakly dominant strategy for D , R  and R+ given
the continuation equilibrium strategies. Moreover, if the equilibrium strategies in the second
and third stages are such that D  wins the general election if all candidates are running, then
Y is not a weakly dominant strategy for D+ either.
36Observe that, in this case, Y is not a weakly dominant strategy for D+, R  and R+ given
the continuation equilibrium strategies. Moreover, if the equilibrium strategies in the second
and third stages are such that D+ wins the general election if all candidates are running (or
R  wins the general election and the preferences of candidate D  are type 2
D  ), then Y is
not a weakly dominant strategy for D+ either.
37Observe that, in this case, Y is not a weakly dominant strategy for D+, R  and R+ given
the continuation equilibrium strategies. Moreover, if the equilibrium strategies in the second
and third stages are such that R  wins the general election if all candidates are running (or
D+ wins the general election and the preferences of candidate D  are type 2
D  ), then Y is
not a weakly dominant strategy for D+ either.
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